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CHAPTER 21 
Epilogue:  What about Trump and Brexit? 
 
Our analysis in this book has been a conditional one.  Assuming certain conditions 
(about competence, independence and sincerity) are satisfied, the pooling of votes by 
majority rule has epistemically beneficial properties. The conditions can be 
weakened and many of those epistemic benefits still follow. However at some point, 
when the conditions are violated too severely, the epistemic benefits of majority 
voting break down. Our argument can thus also be taken as an analysis of why 
democracy does not produce epistemically superior outcomes, when it does not, in 
epistemically radically non-ideal circumstances.  That is the subject of this epilogue. 
 The day after Trump was elected, our colleagues inevitably poked fun at us 
for our work asserting 'the wisdom of crowds'. Joking aside, the election of Donald 
Trump and the vote for 'Brexit' (Britain's exit from the European Union) raise 
inevitable questions that cannot be ignored about the epistemic function of 
democracy.   
We are confident that the analysis offered in this book has internal validity.  
The mathematics are as they are.  Given the assumptions as specified, the 
conclusions are as we report.  Whether those assumptions and the implications 
drawn from them correspond to the real world is, however, something else again. 
Surely they correspond to something in the real world.  That is to say, surely 
there are cases (quite a lot of them, actually) in which there is some fact of the matter 
and people engage in good-faith efforts to pool their information with one another's 
to find out what those facts actually are.  But there are also cases where influential 
actors deliberately, and successfully, mislead others. Take, for example, the 
concerted campaign by the tobacco industry to discredit mounting evidence that 
tobacco smoking causes cancer.1  In the 1950s tobacco companies came together to 
establish  
the Tobacco Industry Research Committee, a sham organization designed to 
spread corporate propaganda to mislead the media, policymakers and the 
public at large. Their goal was not to convince the majority of Americans that 
cigarettes did not cause cancer. Instead, they sought to muddy the waters and 
create a second truth. One truth would emanate from the bulk of the scientific 
community; the other, from a cadre of people primarily in the employment of 
the tobacco industry.  The ruse continued for almost five decades, until 
lawsuits against the industry forced the closure of the 'research institute' and 
the public release of its internal documents. Now anyone with an Internet 
connection can read the full details of the tobacco industry’s expensive efforts 
to create an alternate set of facts about its products.2 
 
The extent of such behaviour in politics has traditionally lain somewhere in 
between the two polar cases of honest information-pooling and utter deception.3  
The 'big lie' is a long established technique (but one historically not all that oft used) 
                                              
1 The best analogue in our own day might be organized climate change denial. 
2 Rabin-Havt 2016; see similarly Harford 2017. It is perhaps no coincidence that it was the business 
world out of which Donald Trump emerged (Barstow 2016).  Indeed, his confidant Roger 
Ailes, sometime CEO of Fox News, served as a secret operative for the tobacco industry 
resisting the Clinton health care reforms in 1993 (Dickinson 2011). But in terms of the 
influences on Trump, the impact of his mentor Ray Cohn – sometime chief counsel of Senator 
McCarthy's communist-witchhunting committee – must not be underestimated (O'Harrow 
and Boburg 2016).  
3 Arendt (1967/1977, p. 227) cynically says, 'no one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on 
rather bad terms with each other'.  Still, the last time before 2016 that a US presidential 
election could have plausibly been said to have been won on the basis of a literal falsehood 
was in 1960, when the foreign policy centerpiece of Kennedy's campaign was the claim that 
the previous Republican administration had allowed a 'missile gap' to arise between the 
USSR and the US.  That was subsequently shown to be untrue.  At the time, however, it was 
reasonably thought to be true by Kennedy and the wider public, on the basis of what were 
still the official US estimates of Soviet military capacity. Only those privy to top-secret 
briefings based on U-2 reconnaissance knew otherwise, and they could not reveal that 
information without giving away that still super-secret technology (Atlantic 2013; CIA 2013).  
Mind you, wars have subsequently been started on the basis of falsehoods (Vietnam, on the 
basis of false reports of attacks on US warships in the Gulf of Tonkin; Iraq, on the basis of 
false reports about Sadam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction); and elections elsewhere 
have been won on the basis of baldfaced lies (in 2001 in Australia, on the basis of lies about 
refugees throwing their children overboard to force the navy to pick them up and take them 
to Australia [Australia Senate Select Committee 2004]). 
for securing political power.4 And the frequency, if not necessarily effectiveness, of 
negative (and often not altogether truthful) advertisements designed to undercut the 
credibility of one's opponents has increased over the past decades.5  But at least, until 
recently, politicians conspicuously caught in lies tended to be punished by voters, 
and in consequence politicians were historically very wary of lying.6  While voters 
may have long been prone to a certain amount of bias, selective perception and 
motivated reasoning, they have traditionally been broadly concerned with 
promoting the truth at least as they see it. 
In terms of our interest in the epistemic performance of democracy, we must 
distinguish two different questions. First is the question about the correctness of 
recent decisions of the electorate. Second is the question about the truth-
conduciveness of the campaigns and processes that led up to those decisions. The 
first question is the one that triggered the snarky comments of our colleagues. Don't 
                                              
4 The technique was enunciated most famously by Orwell (1949) in Nineteen Eighty-Four – which rose 
to the top of Amazon's best-seller list the week after Trump's inauguration, when his former 
campaign manager started talking about 'alternative facts' (Charles 2017).  But it was known 
to Abraham Lincoln, who in 1854 warned of the demagoguery of his nemesis Stephen 
Douglas in these terms: 'It was a great trick among some public speakers to hurl a naked 
absurdity at his audience, with such confidence that they should be puzzled to know if the 
speaker didn’t see some point of great magnitude in it which entirely escaped their 
observation. A neatly varnished sophism would be readily penetrated, but a great, rough non 
sequitur was sometimes twice as dangerous as a well polished fallacy' (quoted in Blumenthal 
2016).  Or as Press Secretary Larry Speakes said a propos President Reagan's apocryphal 
stories, 'If you tell the same story five times, it's true' (quoted in Marcus 2016). 
5 Lau et al. 1999. 
6 Nyhan and Reifler 2015.  As James Fallows describes the old rules, 'public figures would at least try 
to tell the truth most of the time and they would recognize it as a significant penalty if they're 
shown not telling the truth' (quoted in Rehm 2016b).  Traditionally, 'knowledge of the risks of 
being caught has encouraged most politicians to minimize provable lies' (Fallows 2016a).  
Traditionally, straight-out lying has not been a particularly successful strategy of political 
manipulation in the long term (Goodin 1980, ch. 2).  Of course, in Keynes' famous riposte, 'in 
the long run we're all dead' and it may well be that the lies will not be caught in time to do 
any good.  That was Jonathan Swift's (1710) worry:  'it often happens that if a lie be believed 
only for an hour, it hath done its work, and there is no further occasion for it. Falsehood flies, 
and truth comes limping after it, so that when men come to be undeceived, it is too late; the 
jest is over, and the tale hath had its effect: like a man who hath thought of a good repartee 
when the discourse is changed, or the company parted; or like a physician, who hath found 
out an infallible medicine, after the patient is dead.' 
we agree that Brexit and Trump were surely the wrong choices? As citizens we 
certainly do.  But as social scientists we have to tread more cautiously.7 
Our concern in this epilogue is, therefore, with the second question alone.  Our 
concern is not that voters made what we ourselves think were catastrophically 
incorrect decisions in supporting Brexit and Donald Trump for US president. We do 
– but that is beside the present point.  Our point here is that in these two prominent 
cases voters continued to lend their support to those campaigns, even after they 
were clearly shown to be based on blatant falsehoods.  Large numbers of voters 
seemed to be impervious to the truth of the central claims of those campaigns.  Small 
wonder that the Oxford Dictionaries named 'post-truth' the 'word of the year' for 
2016.8 
Such apparent indifference of voters toward the truth should be highly 
worrying for an epistemic theory of democracy.  Certainly, anyway, it should be if 
that were a pattern that is likely to persist, rather than being an aberration limited to 
those two campaigns alone. 
The purpose of this epilogue is to offer our best guesses as to what, exactly, was 
going on with the votes for Brexit and Trump.  In that way, we hope to provide at 
least a set of reflections (our evidence is of course no better than anyone else's, so 
reflections are the most they can claim to be) as to the implications of the events of 
2016 for the general applicability of an epistemic theory of democracy. 
 
 
21.1.  The Political Lies of 2016 
 
                                              
7 After all, we might be wrong in our own assessments – as we think are others (Caplan 2007; Somin 
2013; Brennan 2016) who bemoan 'voter ignorance' based purely on the fact that voters 
disagree with neoliberal economists, who we too think to be often in error.  See similarly 
Killick (2017). 
8 Flood 2016. Wang 2016.  Oxford Dictionaries 2016. 
We begin by substantiating our claim that the Brexit and Trump campaigns were 
based on lies that voters could and should have known to be false on the basis of 
evidence that was readily available at the time they voted.9 Whether voters actually 
knew what they could and should have known, or whether they actually believed 
the falsehoods to be true, is an issue to which we will we return in Sections 21.5 and 
21.7 below. 
 
 
21.1.1.  Brexit Lies 
 
In the UK referendum on the EU, the 'Leave' campaign made many tendentious 
claims.10  But the one upon which we will focus here is the slogan emblazoned in 
huge letters on the side of the Vote Leave Battle Bus in which leaders of that 
campaign (including Boris Johnson and Michael Gove) traveled up and down the 
                                              
9 A lie is, by definition, a falsehood that the speaker utters with the intent that the hearer believe it, the 
speaker knowing it to be untrue. Of course no outsider can really be sure what someone else 
knows, believes or intends.  Some journalists hesitate to call Trump's falsehoods 'lies' for that 
reason (Baker 2017; Baker in NBC Meet the Press 2017).  Others, after the fashion of a jury in a 
criminal trial, judge the weight of evidence to be such that beliefs and intentions can be 
ascribed and lies attributed accordingly (Fallows 2016; Dean Baquet 2016).  Ironically, that is 
precisely the approach the alt-right website Breitbart suggested in relation to 'alternative 
facts' (discussed in section 21.9. below):  Breitbart insisted that that is 'a harmless, and 
accurate, term in a legal setting, where each side of a dispute will lay out its own version of 
the facts for the court to decide' (Gabbatt 2017; see similarly Hughes in Stelter 2016).  It is just 
worth mentioning however that any attorney who literally fabricated evidence – which is 
what the 'alternative facts' in question amount to – would of course be in contempt of court 
(Goodin 2010). 
10 Many of the Leave campaign's claims about immigration were highly dubious – particularly Nigel 
Farage's poster picturing long lines of would-be immigrants who were actually nowhere near 
Britain's borders.  So too was the claim that Turkey was about to join the UK. And many of 
the 'sovereignty-undermining' court cases of which Leave campaigners complained involved 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which is not part of the EU anyway (Grice 
2017).  Advocates of Leave claimed that the Remain campaign was built on Project Fear, 
which they claimed were lies about the economic consequences of Brexit.  Evidence on that so 
far is mixed:  in the first year since the referendum the stock market performed strongly 
(FTSE 2017), but Sterling dropped precipitously to a 31-year low against the US dollar in the 
immediate aftermath of the referendum and has only very partially recovered (Allen et al. 
2016). 
country.  The slogan read:  'We send the EU £350 million a week.  Let's fund our 
NHS instead.  Vote Leave.'11   
That claim was literally a lie in one respect, and it was seriously misleading in 
another. That was the official finding of UK Statistics Authority – 'an independent 
body operating at arm’s length from government as a non-ministerial department directly 
accountable to Parliament'.  And that finding was released fully two months before the 
referendum vote and was widely reported during the rest of the campaign.12   
The Leave campaign's claim was literally a lie in the sense that, while it is true 
that  
'in 2014 the UK's official gross payments to the EU amounted to £19.1 billion 
[the basis for the '£350m per week claim], this amount of money was never 
actually transferred to the EU.  Before the UK government transfers any money 
to the EU a rebate is applied. In 2014 the UK received a rebate of £4.4 billion.  
This means £14 billion was [all that was] transferred from the UK government 
to the EU in official payments.'13   
 
That brings the amount actually transferred down, from £350m per week to just 
under £270m per week. 
Even that sum is seriously misleading, however, because '£4.8 billion came back 
to the public sector in 2014....  Given these figures, ... the UK government's net 
contribution to the EU – ... the difference between the money it paid to the EU and 
the money it received – was £9.9 billion in 2014.'14  That brings the actual net transfer 
down to just over £190m per week – just over half the £350m per week emblazoned 
on the side of the Vote Leave Battle Bus and featured prominently on its website and 
in its leaders' stump speeches throughout the referendum campaign. 
After continued harassment from Vote Leave correspondents the Chair of UK 
Statistics Authority, Sir Andrew Dilnot, issued a further statement saying, 'The 
                                              
11 Of that claim, one Financial Times writer remarked, 'It is hard to think of a previous example in 
modern western politics of a campaign leading with a transparent untruth, maintaining it 
when refuted by independent experts, and going on to triumph anyway' (Harford 2017). 
12 Dilnot 2016a,b; UK Statistics Authority 2016.  BBC 2016; Islam 2016a; Ship 2016. 
13 UK Statistics Authority 2016, emphasis added. 
14 UK Statistics Authority 2016, emphasis added. 
continued use of a gross figure in contexts that imply it is a net figure is misleading and 
undermines trust in official statistics.'15  And even the chief funder of the Leave.UK 
campaign, Arron Banks, agreed in response that 'it's not smart to lie'.16 Leaders of Vote 
Leave nonetheless persisted in these gross misrepresentations all the way to the end of the 
campaign17 – only to repudiate them promptly thereafter.18 
 
 
21.1.2.  Trump Lies 
 
In the case of the Brexit Leave campaign, we have focused on one central lie.  In the 
case of the Trump campaign, there is a plethora to choose among.  Table 21.1 
contains a pot pourri of some of Trump's more outlandish whoppers during the 
campaign, which he typically continued repeating even after they had been revealed 
as such.19 
                                              
15 In what was, in the coded language of the British bureaucracy, a particularly stern rebuke to the 
Vote Leave harassers, Dilnot (2016b) upgraded this from 'potentially misleading' in his earlier 
announcement (Dilnot 2016a). 
16 Quoted in Islam 2016a. 
17 Gove, quoted in Islam 2016a.  Boris Johnson insisted, 'We think it's relevant to keep people focused 
on the global figure, because that is the figure over which we have no control' (quoted in ITV 
2016).  Throughout the rest of the campaign that claim remained on the website of Vote Leave 
(Griffin 2016), the organization officially recognized by the UK Electoral Commission (2016a) 
as 'represent[ing] those campaigning for that outcome to the greatest extent'. 
18 That claim, along with everything else, was wiped from the Vote Leave website within days of the 
referendum (Griffin 2016). Gove, in launching his abortive bid for the Conservative Party 
leadership immediately after the election, reduced the sum promised to the NHS to £100m 
per week:  'Gove insisted he was not retreating from the slogan that implied all £350m would 
go to the NHS, but said that was likely to be the impression given' (Asthana and Mason 
2016).  Others – such as UKIP leader Nigel Farage immediately, and David Davis after he 
became Minister for Brexit – asserted they themselves had never made any such claim (Stone 
2016b; Sparrow 2016a).   
19 One is reminded of Jonathan Swift's (1710) description of an English politician of his generation:  
'his genius consists in nothing else but an inexhaustible fund of political lies, which he 
plentifully distributes every minute he speaks, and ... forgets, and consequently contradicts, 
the next half hour.  He never yet considered whether any proposition were true or false, but 
whether it were convenient for the present minute or company to affirm or deny it....  I think 
he cannot with any justice be taxed with perjury... because he hath often fairly given public 
notice to the world that he believes in neither.' 
  
Table 21.1:  Fact Checking Trump's Lies  
 
Trump claim 
 
Fact Check20 
'Our real unemployment rate is 42 
percent' (18 Aug. 2015).   
 
Actually, it is 5.3%. 'Yes, ... there are ... 
[42%] “not in the work force,” but the 
vast majority of those people do not 
want to work. Most are retired or 
simply are not interested in working, 
such as stay-at-home parents.'21 
 
'We can save as much as $300 billion a 
year' on prescription drugs purchased 
by Medicare (18 Feb. 2016). 
 
Actually, 'total spending in Medicare 
Part D [prescription drugs] in 2014 
was only $78 billion'. 
'On November 1... new numbers are 
coming out which will show 40, 50, 60 
percent increases' in premiums for health 
insurance under the Affordable Care Act 
(26 Sept. 2016). 
 
'This is a classic Trump claim. He 
cherry-picks the most extreme 
examples, applies them to the general 
population.... He says rates will 
increase by 40, 50, 60 percent — but 
the most common plans in the 
marketplace will see an average 
increase of 9 percent. The vast 
majority of marketplace enrollees 
receive government premium 
subsidies and will be protected from 
premium increases.' 
 
'"There are scores of recent migrants 
inside our borders charged with 
terrorism," and "dozens and dozens 
more” per each case known publicly' 
(2 May 2016). 
 
'The claim may be a ... reference to a 
list from the office of Sen. Jeff Sessions 
(R-Ala.) of 30 foreign-born 
individuals who were arrested on 
charges relating to terrorism in recent 
years.... The majority of the 30 cases 
                                              
20 All from Kessler et al. (2016) and links from that url, unless otherwise stated.  Other factcheckers tell 
basically the same stories (Yuhas 2016). 
21 Kessler 2015.   
involved naturalized U.S. citizens – 
people who came to the U.S. as 
children or had arrived before 2011.  
We reviewed similar lists of cases 
from 2014 and 2015, involving 76 
people charged with activities relating 
to foreign terrorist organizations. Of 
them, 57 were U.S. citizens, ... [either] 
naturalized [or] natural-born U.S. 
citizens..., and many of the 
naturalized citizens had arrived in the 
country as children.' 
 
'No, you’re wrong' that stop-and-frisk 
was ruled unconstitutional (28 Sept. 
2016). 
 
'In 2013, U.S. District Judge Shira A. 
Scheindlin, in the Southern District of 
New York..., issued a 195-page 
ruling...  [holding] the city liable for 
violations of the plaintiffs’ rights 
under the Fourth and 14th 
amendments..... The federal appeals 
panel denied the city’s request to 
overturn Scheindlin’s ruling.'  
 
'"There were people over in New 
Jersey, a heavy Arab population, that 
were cheering as the buildings came 
down" on 9/11' (22 Nov. 2015). 
 
Actually, 'Jerry Speziale, the police 
commissioner of Paterson, which has 
the second-largest Muslim population 
in the United States, [said], “That is 
totally false. That is patently false.  
That never happened. There were no 
flags burning, no one was dancing. 
That is bullshit.”' In an attempt to 
defend his claim, 'the Trump 
campaign posted snippets of video 
clips from a local CBS New York City 
newscast at the time that reported on 
the arrest of "eight men" – not 
"thousands and thousands" – who 
were reported by neighbors as having 
celebrated the attack.' 
 
'I was totally against the war in Iraq' 
from the beginning (23 Feb. 2016). 
Actually, in an interview on 11 Sept. 
2002, Howard Stern asked him, 'Are 
 you for invading Iraq?' Trump 
replied, 'Yeah, I guess so.'  The Fact 
Checker continues:  'Trump clearly 
was outspoken about his opposition 
starting in 2004... But by then — 17 
months after the invasion — many 
Americans had turned against the 
war, making Trump’s position not 
particularly unique.  Trump has 
repeatedly cited his remarks in [an] 
August 2004 story to support his 
claim that he was “totally” against the 
war. In light of his repeated false 
claim citing this article, Esquire added 
an editor’s note to [the online version 
of] its August 2004 story [that] 
reads: “The following story was 
published in the August 2004 issue of 
Esquire. During the 2016 presidential 
election, Donald Trump has repeatedly 
claimed to have been against the Iraq War 
from the beginning, and he has cited this 
story as proof. The Iraq War began in 
March 2003, more than a year before this 
story ran, thus nullifying Trump’s 
timeline.”' 
 
 
Beyond the particulars, the sheer frequency and brazenness of Trump's lying is 
utterly astonishing.  Here is the Washington Post's 2016 end-of-year assessment:   
There has never been a serial exaggerator in recent American politics like the 
president-elect. He not only consistently makes false claims but also repeats 
them, even though they have been proven wrong. He always insists he is right, 
no matter how little evidence he has for his claim or how easily his statement is 
debunked.  During the campaign, Trump earned 59 Four-Pinocchio ratings 
['whoppers' – the highest rating], compared with 7 for Hillary Clinton.22 
                                              
22 Kessler 2016a; for a summary of each see Kessler et al. 2016.  George W. Bush, in contrast, 'subtly 
and systematically attempted to deceive the nation about most of his major policy 
proposals... while generally avoiding obviously false statements.  Instead, Bush consistently 
uses well-designed phrases and strategically crafted arguments to distract, deceive and 
 Expressed in another way, '63 percent of the 91 Trump statements that the 
[Washington Post's] Fact Checker has checked were given a Four Pinocchio rating — 
meaning they were... totally false'. To put that in perspective, a 'typical candidate 
gets Four Pinocchios somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of the time', and only 
'14.2 percent of Clinton's claims have been given Four Pinocchios'.23 
Ordinarily factcheckers just focus on major claims, often ones referred to them 
by readers.24  But the magazine Politico undertook to factcheck literally every one of 
Trump's statements for a week.  They found that, during the four hours 43 minutes 
worth of speeches and interviews that Trump gave over the course of that week, he 
made 87 'misstatements, exaggerations or falsehoods'.  That is a rate of one every 
3.25 minutes.25 
Trump's campaign responded to that report with characteristic bluster: 
There is a coordinated effort by the media elites and Hillary Clinton to 
shamelessly push their propaganda and distract from Crooked Hillary's lies 
and flailing campaign. All of these 'fact-check' questions can be easily verified, 
but that’s not what blog sites like Politico want people to believe. Mr. Trump is 
standing with the people of America and against the rigged system insiders, 
and it's driving the media crazy. We will continue to speak the truth and 
communicate directly with the American people on issues they care most 
about, and we won’t let the dishonest, liberal media intimidate us from 
                                              
mislead.  The result is that all but the most careful listeners end up believing something 
completely untrue, while proving the President has lied is usually impossible' (Fritz, Keefer 
and Nyhan 2004, p. 4). 
23 Cillizza 2016; his numbers do not quite tally with Kessler's (2016), because his article was written 
just before the election, while a few factchecks were still underway.  In keeping with his past 
practice, as president Trump earned Four Pinocchios for an interview with Time magazine 
about his lies (Kessler and Lee 2017). ). Similarly, in his first formal meeting with 
congressional leaders after becoming president, Trump insistently repeated four-Pinocchio 
fictions about millions of illegal voters—and as president Trump launched a formal 
government investigation into that matter (Johnson and Zapotosky 2017), even after being 
called on the lies once again by fact checkers (Kessler 2017a; Lee 2017). 
24 Kessler 2013. 
25 Cheney et al. 2016. 
speaking candidly and from the heart. A Donald J. Trump presidency will 
make America great again.26 
 
But the assertion that the facts bear out Trump's claims is, of course, just the big lie at 
work.27  It certainly is true that Politico is a left-wing outlet.  But facts are facts, and 
factchecking protocols are well established.28   
 
 
21.1.3.  How Lies Undercut the CJT 
 
Now, in one way, all those lies might be neither here nor there from the point of 
view of the Condorcet Jury Theorem.  Strictly speaking, all that the CJT says is that 
(as long as its assumptions are met) the majority among a large electorate will vote 
for the right outcome.  And of course, it is logically possible that Leaving the EU was 
the correct outcome of the British referendum, whether or not the UK paid £350m 
per week to the EU, and that electing Trump was the correct outcome of the 
American election, whether or not thousands of Muslims in New Jersey celebrated 
the collapse of the Twin Towers on 9/11. 
Formally, that response is perfectly appropriate.  Epistemic theories of 
democracy are not public reason theories.  Their emphasis is upon 'getting the 
outcome right', not 'giving one another good (true, honest, sincere) reasons'.  Those 
two styles of democratic theory would respond very differently to lying in politics.  
                                              
26 Jason Miller, Trump's senior communications advisor, quoted in Cheney et al. 2016. 
27 As was Trump's (2016a) assertion in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention 
that 'here, at our convention, there will be no lies. We will honor the American people with 
the truth, and nothing else.'  A Washington Post Fact Check identified 25 statements in that 
very speech as being either false or misleading (Kessler and Lee 2016). 
28 Poynter 2017.  Trump continued making an average of 4.92 false or misleading statements a day for 
the first 100 days of his presidency, according to the Washington Post Fact Check (Lee, Kessler 
and Shapiro 2017).  
Theories of public reason would see it as wrong in itself.29  Epistemic theories of 
democracy see it as wrong only insofar as it is likely to compromise voters' 
capability to choose the correct outcome. 
While it is possible for you to end up voting for the correct outcome even 
though your reasoning is based on false facts, it is unlikely that you will.  If your 
reasoning is valid but based on false premises, your conclusions are more likely to be 
wrong than if they had been based on true premises, all else equal.  Choices based on 
false reasoning are not necessarily incorrect, of course.  But if they do end up being 
correct, that will be coincidental – a fluke.  Philosophically we must not rule out 
flukes, but politically we should not count on them.30 
False information designed to alter political attitudes is likely to undermine the 
reasoning of otherwise competent reasoners, leading them to incorrect conclusions 
and to vote in incorrect ways.  Political lies, after all, attempt to change the way 
people behave in the voting booth.  If those people are 'otherwise competent 
reasoners' (i.e., voters who would otherwise be likely to vote correctly31), the lies 
changing their votes would most often change them for the worse, epistemically 
speaking.   
 
 
21.2.  In the US Anyway, the Big Liar Actually Lost  
 
Before we turn to the epistemically bad features of the campaigns themselves, it is 
worth having a closer look at the actual results of the popular vote. 
                                              
29 When 'public reason' theorists sometimes talk of relaxing the 'sincerity' requirement, they do not 
mean to endorse uttering falsehoods but merely the giving of reasons for a course of action 
that would be genuinely good reasons for others to endorse it even if those are not the 
speaker's own reasons for so doing (Schwartzman 2011). 
30 A fluke is just that – a 'lucky stroke, an unexpected success, a piece of good luck' (Oxford English 
Dictionary, q.v. 'fluke' (n3)).  Gettier (1963) showed philosophers why they matter. 
31 I.e., assuming the standard CJT Competence assumption applies to them. 
In the UK, Leave clearly won the majority of votes in the Brexit referendum. 
Furthermore, it almost certainly would have done so even if turnout had not been 
suppressed on the day by flooding that stranded many commuters and closed some 
Underground lines in strongly pro-Remain London.32    
In the US, however, the plain fact of the matter is that Donald Trump lost the 
popular vote in the 2016 presidential election, and he did so by a relatively sizeable 
margin.  Hilary Clinton beat him by almost 3 million votes. Out of a total of more 
than 136 million votes cast, that represents a margin of 2.10% in favour of Clinton.33  
Trump won the presidency due only to the vagaries of the archaic Electoral College.  
But from a CJT point of view, that is irrelevant – or so the argument might go.34 
What that argument does not appreciate, however, is the fact that each of the 
states and territories represented in that Electoral College itself has a very large 
number of voters.  Even the smallest, Wyoming, had over 250,000 people voting in 
the 2016 election.35  With that number of voters we should expect the CJT to take full 
effect, not just in the electorate nationwide but also at the level of each of those state 
electorates.  If the less truthful candidate were the wrong one to win, and people's 
votes tracked the truth with better-than-random accuracy, Trump should have lost 
in every (or virtually every) state – in which case the Electoral College would have 
been virtually unanimous in favour of Clinton.  Needless to say, that did not happen 
in 2016.  
                                              
32 Forster 2016.  'Leave' scored a clear popular majority of 1,269,501 votes; even if London turnout had 
been as high as the nationwide average, there would only have been under 100,000 extra 
London voters, not all of whom would have voted 'Remain' in any case (UK Electoral 
Commission 2016b).  
33 Wasserman  2017.   
34 It is also interesting – but likewise irrelevant, from a CJT perspective – that if some other vote 
aggregation procedure had been used instead of plurality rule Trump would quite likely 
have been defeated in the Republican Primary Elections before ever getting into the General 
Election.  Maskin and Sen (2016) discuss the alternative of Condorcet pairwise comparison, 
but the same would be true of a Borda count. 
35 Wasserman 2017. 
Of course, it is perfectly standard in most elections for one candidate to win 
some states and the other candidate to win others.  That presumably just reflects the 
fact that the interests, values and priorities of people in those states differ.  We have 
shown in chapters 13 and 14 how the CJT might modified to take account of such 
differences; the 2016 election is discussed in terms of that model in section 21.4 
below. 
For now, the crucial fact to note is simply this.  The sheer fact the more truthful 
candidate won the majority of votes nationwide does not, in itself, vindicate the 
epistemic merits of the 2016 US presidential election.  Some other explanation is 
required to account for the fact that she lost the majority of votes in so many places 
that, if voters were competent truth-trackers and truthfulness were all that mattered, 
she should have won easily.  
  
 
21.3.  Sending a Strategic Signal  
 
Maybe the Brexit and Trump outcomes do not really represent the sincere will of the 
majority in another way.   Maybe those outcomes represent, instead, attempts at 
strategic signaling that went wrong.  
Here is one anecdote along those lines.  A person who worked closely with 
Michael Gove and the Vote Leave campaign is reported as having said after the 
referendum, 'We weren’t meant to win. That line, "you were only meant to blow the 
bloody doors off"36 – it’s true. The plan was to run the Remain side close enough to 
scare the EU into bigger concessions. None of us thought we were ever going to 
win.... It’s all such a mess. I want a second referendum now.'37 
                                              
36 The line from the film The Italian Job that Michael Gove's wife reportedly said to him the morning 
after the referendum (Vine 2016). 
37 Quoted in Sparrow 2016b. 
Just how common such sentiments might be among those who voted to Leave 
can be surmised from a large-scale sample survey undertaken by the British Election 
Study after the referendum.  In that survey some 6% of Leave voters reported 
regretting voting the way that they did.  Furthermore, and tellingly for purposes of 
detecting strategic voting, the probability of voters saying they regretted voting to 
Leave was strongly associated with a voter's reporting that ex ante she or he did not 
believe that Leave would win.  Fully one in ten Leave voters who thought ahead of 
the referendum that Leave had no chance of winning said, in that post-referendum 
survey, that they now regret voting for Leave.38 
In the US, too, Trump was not expected to win, either by himself or by a great 
many of his supporters.39  Many (probably most) of those who voted for Trump did 
so despite their perception that he had little chance of winning.  The strategic voting 
question is this:  just how many of those Trump voters voted for him precisely 
because they thought he was not going to win, and hence that voting for him would 
be a 'safe' protest vote?   
Of course, a protest vote ('sending a message') is an expressive act as well; that 
is the topic of section 21.6 below.  But in the circumstances here in view it counts as 
type of strategic voting, too. Unlike standard strategic voting where voters vote as if 
they were pivotal because they care about the outcome, in the case of 'expressive 
strategic voting' voters vote as they do precisely because they believe that they are 
not pivotal.  The counterfactual test for identifying this type of strategic voting is that 
the voter would have voted otherwise if that vote would have determined the 
outcome of the election.40  In that case, the vote is clearly a false indication of the 
voter's own true judgment of who is the best candidate. 
                                              
38 British Election Study 2016. Economist 2016. 
39 Jacobs and House 2016.  Kahn 2016.  
40 Of course in a large electorate it is almost never the case that any one person's vote will actually be 
decisive in this way.  Still, that counterfactual constitutes the proper test to decide whether 
the vote is 'strategic' rather than 'sincere'. 
We have little solid evidence of how many Trump votes were strategic in that 
sense.41  We must largely rely on evidence that is anecdotal and circumstantial.  But 
there is a fair bit of that sort of evidence.  For one thing, Trump went into office with 
historically high 'unfavourable' ratings in the polls – and furthermore, those 
'unfavourable' ratings actually increased as the date of his inauguration neared.42 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that at least some voters, distrustful of Clinton and 
fearing that she might win by a landslide, voted for Trump to deny her too great a 
mandate.43  There is also reason to believe that Trump's 'movement' was always at 
least as much a protest movement as it was a movement that aimed at actually 
seizing power (protesting is one thing, actually governing is quite another...).44  None 
of that is remotely conclusive, but all of it is consistent with the possibility that at 
least some of Trump voters might have voted for him purely strategically to send a 
protest message and would not have voted for him had they foreseen that he would 
actually win. 
Further evidence along those same lines can be found in Trump voters' own 
assessment of his fitness for office. According to exit polls, an astonishing 23% of 
                                              
41 Anecdotal evidence can be found in the compilation of tweets at '@Trump_Regrets' (Kassam 2017). 
42 Saad 2017. 
43 There is for example Lu's (2016) report of 'David Marcus [who] has recently argued that at least for 
him (as a resident of New York State), a Trump vote is the most reasonable form of protest 
vote. He doesn’t like Trump. But he knows his state has no chance of going red, and he 
doesn’t want Hillary Clinton to run away with a landslide popular vote.'  Or for another 
example, Rhonnie Enterline (28, Sacramento, Calif.) explained to the Washington Post, 'If I 
weren't in California where my presidential vote doesn't count for much, I might not have 
voted for [Trump]. But, I thought, why not be part of sending a message to Washington?' 
(quoted in Kelly 2016). 
44 In his column the day after the election, Garrison Keillor (2016b) wrote: 'The Trumpers never 
expected their guy to actually win the thing, and that’s their problem now. They wanted only 
to whoop and yell, boo at the H-word, wear profane T-shirts, maybe grab a crotch or two, 
jump in the RV with a couple of six-packs and go out and shoot some spotted owls. It was 
pleasure enough for them just to know that they were driving us wild with dismay — by 
“us,” I mean librarians, children’s authors, yoga practitioners, Unitarians, bird-watchers, 
people who make their own pasta, opera-goers, the grammar police, people who keep books 
on their shelves, that bunch. The Trumpers exulted in knowing we were tearing our hair out. 
They had our number, like a bratty kid who knows exactly how to make you grit your teeth 
and froth at the mouth.' 
those who said they voted for Trump also said that they regarded him as 'not 
qualified to serve as president'; and 27% said that they did not think he 'has the 
temperament to serve effectively as president'.45  Of course, it is perfectly possible 
that they voted genuinely intending to install him as president, notwithstanding his 
unsuitably, on the ground that they thought that the alternative candidate was more 
unsuitable.  But another interpretation, equally or more plausible (particularly when 
set against the background fact that so many of his supporters did not expect Trump 
to win), is that at least some of those Trump voters were voting strategically, 
intending to send a message, not intending to send their candidate to the White 
House.  It seems likely that at least some of them (who knows how many) might 
have voted otherwise, had they foreseen that Trump might actually win.  
Here is one final bit of evidence (admittedly, circumstantial once again) of 
'buyer's regret' surrounding Trump's election.  The Republican campaign focused 
heavily on a promise to repeal the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare).  In the Kaiser 
Foundation Tracking Poll just before the election, 69% of intending Republican 
voters said they wanted to 'repeal the entire law'; yet in the month after the election, 
that had dropped precipitously to 52%.46  Nothing much had happened over the 
course of that month except the election.  So that looks very much like a case of 'be 
careful what you wish for' – i.e., Republican voters regretting, if not necessarily their 
vote, anyway the consequences of their vote for their health insurance.  Of course, 
their original vote may have been completely sincere and the regret may have set in 
only afterwards.  But this pattern is also consistent with at least some Trump voters 
having voted strategically, intending only to 'send a message' and not sincerely 
intending that he should be elected president.   
                                              
45 CNN 2016. 
46 Kirzinger et al. 2016. 
Who knows how many Trump voters were actually thinking like that.47 It may 
have been only a relatively small number. Still, even a small number of strategic 
voters might have made all the difference where the margin of victory is even 
smaller.   
Furthermore, the number of voters engaged in this sort of 'expressive strategic 
voting' is likely to be larger than the number engaged in strategic voting of the more 
ordinary sort. Ordinary strategic voting is designed to change the result of the 
election, and the chances of succeeding in that are usually pretty slim. Expressive 
strategic voting, in contrast, is designed to send a protest message, and the success of 
that messaging does not depend on changing the result of the election.  Knowing it is 
unlikely that her vote will change the outcome of the election dissuades a voter from 
engaging in strategic voting of the former sort but liberates her to engage in strategic 
voting of the latter sort, by voting for a candidate for whom she would not have 
supported had she expected her vote to be pivotal.   
Notice finally that, given the logic of such expressive strategic voting, such 
votes are invariably concentrated on one side of politics – namely, the side that was 
generally expected to lose ahead of the voting.  So it could well be true that, had 
everyone voted sincerely, neither Brexit and Trump would have won. 
 
 
21.4.  Differing Priorities 
 
A highly plausible explanation of the – to many of us, surprising – outcomes of the 
UK EU referendum and the 2016 US presidential election is that voters on opposing 
sides simply had different interests, priorities or values from one another.   
                                              
47 Polls taken around his 100 day anniversary in office show that 'just 4 percent of Trump's supporters 
say they would back someone else if there was a redo of the election' (Blake 2017d). 
Empirically, that certainly seems true.  The standard analysis of both cases is 
that the priorities of metropolitan elites simply differed from those of voters in the 
deindustrialized hinterlands.  That much is plain from the electoral maps that reveal 
sharply geographically differentiated bases of support for Trump and Brexit 
respectively.48  And it is confirmed by polls showing that voters for the two opposing 
sides identified very different issues as being the 'most important'.49 This also 
explains why, despite winning the popular vote quite decisively, Clinton lost many 
swing states especially in the Rust Belt. 
Normatively, the question is simply whether even the more modest claims for 
the epistemic merits of majority outcomes sketched in chapters 13 and 14 can be 
sustained with respect to the Trump and Brexit majorities.  As we observed in those 
chapters, where people have different interests, priorities or values, each voter is 
voting on the basis of what he or she believes to be the correct outcome from the 
point of view of his or her own interests, priorities or values, which differ from those 
of other voters.  In such circumstances, the most that the CJT can claim (which is still 
quite a lot, if it is true) is the majority winner will be the outcome that is correct from 
the point of view of the interests, priorities or values of the majority of voters – 
assuming that each voter is better than random at choosing the correct outcome for 
furthering his or her own interests, priorities or values.  
                                              
48 For the US see < http://www.nytimes.com/elections/results/president> and for the UK see 
<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-
referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/eu-referendum-result-
visualisations>. 
49 In the 2016 US election, exit polls showed Trump voters were far more likely to say that 
'immigration' or 'terrorism' were the most important issues, compared to Clinton voters (by 
64% to 33% and 57% to 40% respectively); Clinton voters were far more likely to nominate 
'foreign policy' (60% to 33%) and, oddly enough, 'the economy' (52% to 41%) (CNN 2016).  In 
the UK Brexit referendum, an eve-of-poll survey found Leave voters were far more likely to 
say that 'immigration' and 'Britain's right to act independently' were 'most important to you 
in deciding how to vote' (by 35% to 2% and 45% to 18% respectively); Remain voters were far 
more likely to say 'jobs, investment and the economy generally' (by 60% to 8%) (YouGov 
2016a). 
But is that competence assumption warranted in the case of Brexit or Trump 
voters?  Perhaps it is in terms of the values and priorities manifested by Leave voters 
in the Brexit referendum – Leave presumably is indeed the correct outcome if, as 
post-referendum polling suggests, the priorities of Leave voters were to restore 
British sovereignty over laws that applied in Britain, to reduce immigration (at least 
from within the EU) and to reduce or eliminate costly British contributions to the 
EU.50  Whether Leave is in the objective economic interests of those who voted for it in 
other senses is another question, however. EU regional funds go disproportionately 
to regions that voted in favour Leave, which would of course result in those funds 
being cut off, for only the most salient example.51 But if this referendum was less 
about the paycheck and more about identity, perhaps Brexit is just what the majority 
wanted.  
Similarly in the US, it may be that Trump's diffuse slogan, 'Make America 
Great Again', resonated with his voters' values and priorities.  Maybe his vague 
promises to prevent jobs from moving abroad and restricting immigration resonated 
with their values and priorities, too.  Or anyway maybe it sounded as if voting for 
Trump was the right way for them to promote those values and priorities.  Given 
how little detail he offered, however, it would have been hard to say for sure.  
Indeed, given how much he lied about everything else during the campaign, it 
would have been hard to say whether there was even a better than random chance of 
that being true. 
Whatever doubts we might have whether voting for Trump was the right way 
for his supporters to promote their own values and priorities, those doubts are 
redoubled when it comes to the question of whether voting for him was the right 
way for his supporters best to serve their own objective interests.  Again, Trump's 
                                              
50 Luck 2016. 
51 Dean 2016.  EU funds might be replaced by ones from the UK central government, of course; but if 
they were, then that would reduce the '£350m per week' savings from leaving EU that would 
be available for the UK government to spend elsewhere (on the NHS, as Leave promised, for 
example). 
policy proposals were so sketchy and incompletely specified, at the time of the 
election that no voter could have had the remotest way of determining whether they 
were genuinely in his or her own objective interests.  Given how much he lied about 
everything else, voters could not even be confident that there was a better-than-
random chance that he would do what he promised, insofar as he did make any 
specific promises. And indeed, on many topics the balance of evidence available to 
them should have suggested that the policies Trump was most likely to pursue were 
not in their objective interests. 
Consider for example the Republicans' promise to repeal Obamacare, one of the 
central and most specific planks of their campaign and one that Trump immediately 
acted upon in one of the first Executive Orders he signed upon assuming the 
presidency.  The fact of the matter is that it is only because of Obamacare that a great 
many of Trump's poor and unemployed Rust Belt supporters have insurance to 
protect them against the extremely high costs of US medical care.  The non-partisan 
Congressional Budget Office estimates that, on the initial Republican plan for repeal-
and-replacement (H.R. 3762), 'the number of people who are uninsured would 
increase by 18 million in the first ... year following enactment of the bill' and 
'premiums... would increase by 20 percent to 25 percent'.52 Assuming that estimate is 
correct, the interests of a great many of Trump's voters in affordable health 
insurance will be ill served by that policy.53 
That is the case not only objectively but subjectively as well, judging from focus 
groups with Trump supporters in Rust Belt states in December 2016.  In those 
discussions, 
Several [participants] described their frustration with being forced to change 
plans annually to keep premiums down, losing their doctors in the process. But 
asked about policies found in several Republican plans to replace the 
Affordable Care Act — including a tax credit to help defray the cost of 
premiums, a tax-preferred savings account and a large deductible typical of 
                                              
52 CBO 2017. 
53 In certain clear respects, at least:  perhaps in other respects they think of themselves as having a 
'dignity' interest in being able to afford to pay for health insurance without a state subsidy. 
catastrophic coverage — several of these Trump voters recoiled, calling such 
proposals 'not insurance at all.'54 
 
There is one final way to try to make sense of how people might have seen 
voting for Trump or Brexit as being in their objective interests.  Maybe they were 
thinking 'nothing could be worse than the status quo, and at least they will shake 
things up'.  Trump put the point precisely like that in attempting (largely 
unsuccessfully) to appeal to black voters, asking, 'What the hell have you got to 
lose?'55  Interviews with many of Trump's white working class supporters indicate 
that they, too, were thinking along those lines.56  In Britain, many backed Brexit 
based on similar reasoning.57 
Again, that may well be an accurate characterization of the thinking of some 
(perhaps many) Trump and Brexit voters.  They voted for change simply out of deep 
despair with the status quo.  But for the chapter 14 version of the CJT to apply, it 
must be the case that such voters were actually correct in thinking that 'nothing 
could be worse' than the status quo.58  When terminal cancer patients volunteer to 
participate in trials of new drugs, bioethicists worry that the quality of their consent 
might be compromised by the 'therapeutic illusion', leading them to suppose that 
what the researchers intend only as an experiment with a new drug might actually 
have positive therapeutic effects.59  From the point of view of willing research 
subjects, however, it is not at all a bad bet:  after all, there is some chance (however 
                                              
54 Altman 2017. 
55 Bump 2016.  Newt Gingrich summarized the 'Principles of Trumpism' to the Heritage Foundation a 
month after the election in the phrase 'he repeated again and again: "Donald Trump's gonna 
kick over the table"' (Gingrich 2016, quoted in Godfrey 2016). 
56 Kelly 2016. 
57 In the postmortems on Brexit, one 62-year old London jobseeker was quoted as saying, 'Leaving the 
EU might make my life shit, but it's shit anyway.  So how much worse can it get?  I've got 
nothing to lose.... ' (Martin Parker, quoted in Ryan 2016). 
58 A more sophisticated, and more plausible, version of this line of thought would be couched in 
terms of 'the probability is sufficiently high that they will do something sufficiently better for 
me than the status quo'.  Maybe that is what some supporters of Trump and Brexit were 
thinking; but the more extreme formulation in the text is how they actually put it. 
59 Casarett 2016.   
small) that the drug will work; and terminally ill cancer patients genuinely do have 
nothing to lose.  Does anyone seriously believe that Trump and Brexit voters can say 
the same with anything like the same confidence?60 
Thus, it may well be that their distinctive priorities, values and interests drove 
a majority of voters to support Trump in the US and Brexit in the UK, contrary to the 
priorities, values and interests of the rest of the electorate.  But whether the 
moderately happy CJT conclusion we adduced in chapters 13 and 14 follows is in 
doubt.  Certainly, as regards their interests, and perhaps even their values and 
priorities, it is far from clear that voting for Trump or Brexit really was indeed the 
correct way for those people to best further their own objectives. 
 
 
21.5.  Opinion Leaders Lied, and Voters Believed Them 
 
Let us now turn our attention to the campaigns and their epistemic flaws. Trump 
and leaders of the Brexit Leave campaign lied; we know that from section 21.1 
above. We also know that a lot of people paid attention to what they said.  Surveys 
found, curiously enough, that Boris Johnson (who had previously been twice fired 
for lying) was the political leader most trusted by Britons who voted to Leave the 
EU.61  And Donald Trump, whose preferred mode of messaging is the 140-character 
tweet, has over 20 million Twitter followers and 'an audience attentiveness score of 
                                              
60 Bump 2016.  Ehrenfreund 2016.  A former George W. Bush speechwriter summarizes the strategy 
thusly:  'Because poor neighborhoods can't get any worse, why not try something new? 
Because America is already a jihadist battleground, why not take a radical and discriminatory 
new direction on immigration? Because the planet is in chaos, why not entirely reorient 
American foreign policy toward alliances and great power rivals?  Things, after all, can't get 
any worse.'  Michael Gerson then pointedly adds:  'The problem is:  Things can get a lot 
worse, and quickly' (quoted in Tumulty and Nakamura 2017). 
61 YouGov 2016b.  In previous incarnations, Johnson had 'been sacked twice, and on both occasions ... 
for dishonesty:  once by the Times for making up a quote, and again by the former Tory 
leader Michael Howard, for lying to his face about an extramarital affair' (Freedland 2016; 
Major 2016). 
75%'.62 In short, in both the UK and US cases there were strong opinion leaders who 
lied. 
But did the voters actually believe their lies?  In the UK, we have survey 
evidence showing that they did. A poll conducted shortly before the referendum 
found that 47% of all respondents believed to be true the claim that 'Britain sends 
£350 million a week to the European Union', and only 39% believed it to be false.63  
Furthermore, in polling after the referendum, nearly one in five Leave voters named 
that claim as their primary reason for voting to Leave the EU.64   
We do not have systematic polling in the US pertaining to each of Trump's 
many lies.  But we do have anecdotal evidence that at least some of his voters 
genuinely believed at least some of the 'fake news' promulgated by Trump and his 
supporters.  Perhaps the most famous example concerns the 'Pizzagate' myth, 
generated by social media and subsequently fueled by a tweet from Michael G. 
Flynn, a member of Trump's transition team and son of Trump's national security 
advisor designate at the time. That story linked 'Hillary Clinton, her campaign 
chairman and the owner of [the pizza shop] Comet Ping Pong to [an] alleged sex-
slave conspiracy'.65  A North Carolina man, Edgar Maddison Welch, 'became so 
fixated on [that] fake news story that he drove [to Washington]... determined to take 
action.... For 45 minutes... Welch, cradling an AR-15 assault-style rifle, roamed the 
Comet Ping Pong pizza restaurant looking to prove an Internet conspiracy theory.... 
With D.C. police amassing outside..., Welch finally walked out with his hands up — 
but not before he finished his search.  He had come to rescue the children, court 
papers say he later told police, and now was convinced that none was being harmed 
there.'66   
                                              
62 According to TwitterCounter (2017). 
63 Ipsos MORI 2016, p. 6. 
64 Luck 2016, p. 8. 
65 According to one report, 'despite being widely debunked and described by the police as "fictitious" 
[that story] was still believed by 9% of registered voters' (Naughton 2017). 
66 Hermann et al. 2016. Washington Post Editorial Board 2016. 
To such anecdotal evidence, we can add a certain amount of polling data.  
Some pertain to specific statements on which Trump backers insistently endorse his 
version of the facts despite clear evidence it is false.  Here are two examples.  In a 
post-election poll, 52% of Republicans said that Trump really won the popular vote.67  
And in another post-inauguration poll, respondents were shown two photos of the 
Washington Mall, one taken during Obama's 2009 inauguration and the other taken 
during Trump's 2017 inauguration; when asked in which photo there were more 
people, 15% of Trump supporters denied the clear evidence of their own eyes and 
asserted that the 2017 photo showed more people on the Mall.68   
We can add to that other polling data on the more general question of whether 
voters consider each of the candidates as 'honest and trustworthy'. Neither Trump 
nor Clinton scored highly on that among the electorate as a whole.69  But each did 
well among his or her own voters.70  Fully 94% of Trump voters reported believing 
Trump to be 'honest and trustworthy', despite his having been shown to have been 
lying so repeatedly.71 Perhaps respondents did not believe Trump's specific 
assertions, but they nonetheless thought him to be speaking some 'deeper truth'. We 
will discuss that possibility in section 21.7.2 below.  Still, the responses taken at face 
value seem to constitute at least prima facie evidence that a large proportion his 
supporters actually believed Donald Trump's many lies. 
                                              
67 Oliver and Wood 2016.   
68 Schaffner and Luks 2017.  Whether people really believed that, or whether they were just saying 
that in order to support Trump, is of course an open question.  Other evidence suggests that 
'partisan bias' (and motivated reasoning and confirmation bias more generally) is overcome 
with only rather modest 'accuracy incentives' (Prior et al. 2015). 
69 Clinton by 64% to 36%, Trump by 64% to 33% (CNN 2016).  But when other polls asked which 
candidate they regarded as more honest, around 45% persistently said 'Trump' – 
astonishingly enough, given the evidence reported in section 21.1.2 above (Cillizza 2016). 
70 94% of Trump voters considered him 'honest and trustworthy', as did the same percentage of 
Clinton voters her.  When exit polls asked 'which candidate is honest?' only 29% of all voters 
responded 'neither is' (CNN 2016). 
71 CNN 2016.  A month into his presidency, 78% of Republicans still said they trusted Trump rather 
than the media 'to tell the truth about important issues' (Sargent 2017a).  As Jonathan Swift 
(1710) quipped in an earlier era, 'as the vilest writer hath his readers, so the greatest liar hath 
his believers'. 
In chapter 11 above we have discussed the phenomenon of opinion leadership 
from a CJT perspective.  There we argue that, if voters follow opinion leaders rather 
than exercising their own independent judgment, those voters are (at best) 
collectively only as likely to be correct as their opinion leader is.   If an opinion 
leader is wrong (whether innocently or intentionally so) in the guidance he provides, 
voters following him will be misled accordingly and the wrong outcome may well 
win a majority as a result.   
In terms of the Condorcet Jury Theorem as it is standardly construed, the fault 
lies with a failure of the Independence Assumption as applied to voters who follow 
opinion leaders. But in the case of opinion leaders who deliberately lie, there is a 
second failing as well – a second-order failure of Sincerity.  In our previous 
discussions, we have implicitly been assuming that opinion leaders at least make a 
good-faith effort to lead their followers to what they themselves genuinely believe to 
be correct outcomes.  Opinion leaders might be wrong about that and accidentally 
mislead their followers in consequence.  But when they deliberately lie, they 
intentionally mislead their followers – certainly in what to believe, and quite 
probably in how to vote as well.   
Formally, nothing changes in the chapter 11 analysis of opinion leadership, of 
course.  The probability that the majority of an opinion leader's faithful followers 
supports the correct outcome is still fixed by the probability that the opinion leader 
himself will support the correct outcome.  The only difference is that, with lying 
opinion leaders, that probability is likely to be lower than with truthful opinion 
leaders.  The analytics are identical – the upshot is merely more depressing. 
In chapter 11 we were relatively sanguine about the dangers of opinion 
leadership.  Our grounds were that the overall effects of opinion leadership would 
be likely to cancel out if (a) there are multiple, independent opinion leaders 
commanding different segments of the electorate as followers or (b) there are many 
independent, lower-level opinion leaders mediating the influence of top-level 
opinion leaders, then.  But those happy predictions fail when top-level opinion 
leaders have direct, unmediated access to voters, via Twitter and Facebook and such 
like, or when too many opinion leaders are interconnected with one another and 
send the same message.  Both were the case, definitely with the 2016 US presidential 
election and arguably with the UK EU referendum as well – again, making the 
implications for chapter 11's analytics more depressing as applied to those two cases. 
 
  
 
21.6.  Affective Explanations 
 
In Section 21.3, we already briefly looked at strategic protest voting – voters hoping 
to send a ‘warning shot’ message without changing the outcomes. But what 
precisely do these voters intend to communicate? Here we will examine a suite of 
'affective' explanations for the outcomes of the two 2016 elections under discussion.   
These explanations are sometimes lumped together under the heading of 
'expressive voting'.72  The essence of that claim is that a voter votes to 'express' 
something (which can be accomplished by the sheer act of voting in itself) rather 
than for any consequentialist reasons that depend on his or her vote actually 
changing the outcome of the election. 
For CJT purposes, however, it matters less whether people are voting for 
consequentialist or non-consequentialist reasons.  What matters is instead what 
voters are trying to express – namely, whether or not they are expressing, through 
their votes, choices that they think to be tracking the truth.  As we have argued in 
section 4.3.3 above, it is perfectly coherent for a voter to vote perfectly truthfully and 
sincerely for what he or she believes should be the correct outcome of the election, 
without being under any misapprehension whatsoever that his or her vote has any 
realistic chance of causing that outcome to prevail.  Hence in our discussion of 
                                              
72 Brennan and Lomasky 1993. 
affective voting we will be sensitive to what affects were involved and what truth 
value, if any, they might have. 
 
 
 21.6.1. Expressing Emotions 
 
In naming 'post-truth' its word of the year for 2016, the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines it as 'relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief'.73   
The appeal to emotion, and a corresponding indifference to facts, is far from 
new in politics, of course.74  But in the 2016 US presidential election, it was carried to 
new heights.  As President Obama remarked of his successor, 'Trump understands 
the new ecosystem, in which facts and truth don’t matter. You attract attention, 
rouse emotions, and then move on. You can surf those emotions.'75  
Trump spokespeople sometimes forthrightly admitted that they were playing 
on emotions that were not only ungrounded in facts but indeed flatly contrary to 
them.  Take for example this CNN interview with Newt Gingrich.  When the 
interviewer challenged Trump's false claims about soaring crime rates, Gingrich 
replied,  
'The average American — I'll bet you this morning — does not think crime is 
down, does not think they are safer.' 
'But we are safer and it is down', says [the interviewer], citing FBI data to that 
effect. 
                                              
73 Flood 2016. 
74 As Elizabeth Drew commented on Ronald Reagan's first tilt at the presidency in 1976, his appeal 
had 'to do not with competence at governing but with the emotion he evokes.  Reagan lets 
people get out their anger and frustration, their feeling of being misunderstood and 
mishandled by those who have run our government, their impatience with taxes and with the 
poor and the weak, their impulse to deal with the world’s troublemakers by employing the 
stratagem of a punch in the nose' (quoted in Rich 2016). 
75 Obama 2016. 
'No', says Gingrich. 'That's your view....  What I said is also a fact', Gingrich 
continues, as if patiently explaining something obvious to a child. 'The current 
view is that liberals have a whole set of statistics that theoretically might be 
right, but it's not where human beings are.'  
Confronted with the fact that the crime statistics cited come from the FBI — 
hardly a 'liberal' organization — Gingrich makes it clear that he doesn't care. 
'No, but what I said is equally true. People feel more threatened. As a political 
candidate, I'll go with how people feel, and I'll let you go with the 
theoreticians.'76 
In the UK, Brexit campaigners deliberately took a leaf from the early Trump 
campaign in that respect.  Arron Banks, the chief financial backer of the Leave.EU 
campaign, attributed its success to hiring a Washington firm that taught them that 
'facts don't work'.  He went on to say, 'The Remain campaign featured fact, fact, fact, 
fact, fact.  It just doesn't work.  You have got to connect with people emotionally.  It's 
the Trump success', both in the primary elections of which Banks was speaking and 
in the general election that followed.77 Trump's strategy in that respect was 
mimicked by the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum.   
How ought we to evaluate those emotional appeals in terms of the Condorcet 
Jury Theorem?  One approach, along the lines of chapter 13 above, might be to say 
that, so long as people are more likely than not to be correct about what worries 
them and what it would take to ease those concerns, the vote of the majority is 
highly likely to point to the correct outcome for purposes of easing the majority's 
concerns.  But when people's worries are based on false facts, then there seems little 
reason to believe that people will indeed be more likely than not to be correct (or 
even better than random) about what actions would be best suited to easing their 
concerns. 
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 21.6.2.  Expressing Identity 
 
Certainly one aspect of identity – 'party identity' – ended up being central to 
Trump's victory. During the campaign it did not look as if it was going to be. 
Republicans, both elite and mass, had been wary of supporting Trump after what 
many regarded as his 'hostile takeover' of their party.  Former Republican presidents 
refused to endorse him; Barry Goldwater's daughter denounced him.  Yet, in the end 
Republican voters came around. In the wake of the dual gratuitous interventions by 
the FBI Director late in the campaign, undecided Republican voters reluctantly got 
behind their party's candidate – and that seems to have been the main reason the 
polls (which Clinton had been leading comfortably throughout the previous month) 
closed so dramatically in the closing days of the campaign.78 Come election day, exit 
polls showed the same proportion of self-identifying Republicans voting for Trump 
as of self-identifying Democrats voting for Clinton.79   
That self-identifying Republicans should identify with the Republican 
candidate is one thing.  That economically hard-pressed Rust Belt voters should 
identify with the occupant of a gold-plated penthouse atop a Manhattan mini-
skyscraper bearing his own name is quite another.  Personal style is a large part of 
the story, perhaps.  Whatever personality disorder drives Trump, it leads him to 
behave in ways reminiscent of a short-order cook in a Tuscaloosa greasy-spoon 
restaurant – behaviour that clearly resonates with a large swathe of voters in flyover 
America.80  That is how an 81-year-old Pennsylvania restaurant owner explains 
Trump's appeal to so many of his formerly Democratic customers:  'With the 
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majority of them, I think it was his ordinary man's conversation.  It wasn't rehearsed.  
He said it like he felt it was.  They all identified with the guy.'81 
In addition to Trump's presentational style – his limited vocabulary, fractured 
grammar, persistent misspellings – there is something else that attracted Rust Belt 
voters.82  That is what sociologists term the 'hidden injuries of class'.83   
Trump’s Twitter rants – their explosive and unmediated primal fury – tap into 
a deeper wellspring than just economic anxiety. His in-the-moment, 
consequence-free, grandly unedited Twitter style is a potent fantasy for 
working-class people who have to step cautiously through the daily 
discouragements of their lives.... 
 
These are people who lack agency. Who are resigned to a bite-your-tongue-
and-take-crap relationship with their world; a battery of daily demeanments. 
These come from a brew of horrendous bosses; credit-stealing and slothful 
coworkers; disconnected and oblivious senior management; overbearing in-
laws; demanding children; idiot foremen; and non-responsive insurance 
company bureaucrats (who themselves have no agency.)  
 
Enter Trump. Every time he responds to a big attack or a micro-slight, however 
undisciplined and dramatically over-aggrieved it might be, the cathartic joy 
meter lights up like the Christmas tree in the lobby of Trump Tower. 
 
Good for you, Donald. You don’t take any shit. If I were a billionaire neither 
would I.84 
 
Needless to say, the sheer fact that Donald Trump's Twitter tantrums make left-
behind voters feel good – the fact that he does outrageous things that they wish they 
                                              
81 Quoted in McCarthy 2017.  Similarly, a woman at a Trump rally explained that 'he's down to our 
level.  He's not like past presidents who prepare a beautiful speech but it's not coming from 
the heart.  He speaks it like it is' (quoted in Pilkington 2016). 
82 Milbank 2017.  Sclanfani 2017. 
83 Sennett and Cobb 1993; Jütten 2017.  The president of the American Enterprise Institute explains it 
in terms of how 'people are stripped of their sense of dignity... when they feel superfluous to 
society, when they feel that they are not needed...  Donald Trump was talking to people in 
the parts of America that have been truly forgotten and left behind now for generations in a 
way that... helped people understand that he understood...' (quoted in Capehart 2017).  For 
more in-depth analyses of the current American malaise in these terms, see Hochschild (2016) 
and Isenberg (2016). 
84 Hanft 2016. 
could do – in no way proves that he is the correct candidate to support, even just in 
terms of their promoting their own values and priorities much less their interests.   
Some political theorists say that it is good, from a democratic point of view, if 
people elect representatives who are 'just like themselves'.  The reason they say that 
is that, if voters do so, their representatives in the legislature are likely to vote just 
the same way as their constituents would have done had they been there.85  There is 
no reason to think that that is true of Trump, however.  Strongly though his 
supporters might identify with Trump's behaviour and his personal style, that is no 
guarantee whatsoever of any identity of interests, values or policy preferences or 
priorities.  If voters use these as cues (in ways we discuss in chapter 12), they misfire 
spectacularly. 
At best, any association is random.  And it might be worse than that, insofar as 
whatever it is in Trump's behaviour that his supporters see as akin to their own 
actually has a much different source (if, for example, he is just a psychologically 
disturbed rich kid).  Hence a chapter 13 style CJT defence of the epistemic merits of a 
majority in favour of his election seems on shaky ground in this respect as well. 
 
 
21.6.3.  Having Fun 
 
Another broadly affective explanation of the Trump success may be just this.  
Perhaps his supporters did not believe, or even care, what he was saying.  Maybe 
they were just having fun.  Maybe it was purely entertainment, and in voting for 
Trump they were saying nothing more than they 'want the show to go on' – just as 
they might 'vote' for a reality television contestant who amuses them to remain on 
the show for another week.  And maybe the same was true to a lesser extent with the 
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UK Brexit referendum, where everyone remarks upon how one of the leading Leave 
campaigners, Boris Johnson, insistently plays the part of a 'clown' and a 'buffoon'.86 
Again, the blurring of 'news' and 'entertainment' is far from new.  Just recall the 
'yellow journalism' that sold all those Pulitzer and Hearst newspapers in the 1890s.  
Or, in more recent times, think of the sorts of 'newspapers' that you see at 
supermarket checkout counters.87  No one buys them because they believe the truth 
of their stories of alien abduction or Martians landing in Soldier's Field.  People buy 
them for their entertainment value, not their news value.  Or anyway, most people 
do. 
Arguably the Trump phenomenon was largely about entertainment. 
Undoubtedly that was so in its early stages.88  Right throughout the campaign, 
however, 'cable news networks routinely broadcast Trump rallies not for their civic 
content but for their ratings boost', as Trump's surrogate Newt Gingrich boasted in 
an address on 'The Principles of Trumpism' to the right-wing Heritage Foundation a 
month after the election. 89 
Much about Trump's rallies did indeed suggest that they were about 
entertainment more than anything else.  The pulsating old rock anthems and the 
call-response chants remind one of nothing more than a small town high school 
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87 'An army of crazed monkeys.  John Belushi's drug dealer.  Lee Harvey Oswald's autopsy photo.  
The contents of Henry Kissinger's trash cans.  A woman who used her son's face as an 
ashtray.  The presidential candidacy of Donald Trump... Over the years, an array of jaw-
dropping oddities has drawn readers to the National Enquirer...  Now it is the real estate 
developer's turn on top' (Gillette 2016).  But the National Enquirer is the semi-respectable face 
of supermarket tabloids.  For an even more extreme case, consider the Weekly World News 
(Heller 2014). 
88 Here is the report of CNN interviews with 150 Trump supporters early in the campaign:  'When he 
hit the campaign trail [immediately after announcing his candidacy], the crowds quickly 
swelled. Thousands were soon turning up at school gymnasiums, auditoriums and local 
event halls to see Trump in person, forming long, winding lines that often spilled into 
overflow rooms. In the first weeks and months of Trump's campaign, plenty of attendees 
admitted they were there to catch a glimpse of the former host of the "The Apprentice" – 
maybe even shake hands with the TV star' (Lee et al. 2016). 
89 Vyse (2016), glossing Gingrich (2016).  See also Halloway 2016.  By one estimate, Trump received $2 
billion worth of free media coverage during the first half of the primary election campaign 
alone (Confessore and Yourish 2016). 
football pep rally (an impression strongly reinforced by the fact that Trump's rallies 
were indeed typically held in pretty small venues in pretty small towns).  Most 
tellingly, perhaps, is the fact that in his seemingly extemporaneous rambles at those 
events Trump himself repeatedly made much of the fact that everyone was 'having 
fun'.   
Trump often opened his rallies a rhetorical question, 'Is there anyplace more 
fun to be than at a Trump rally?'90  He repeated it often.  As a protestor was being 
roughly evicted from one of his rallies, Trump famously said, 'Try not to hurt him 
[but] if you do I'll defend you in court...' – immediately adding, once again, 'Are 
Trump rallies the most fun? We're having a good time.'91  Recalling the rally in which 
he famously instructed a mother with a crying baby to leave the room, Trump 
conjured up this image in his mind's eye: 'Everyone's having fun, we're smiling, I'm 
waving.  Everyone's having fun...'92  
Of course, it's perfectly possible for political rallies to be genuinely enjoyable 
without their being nothing but pure entertainment.  Still, one highly plausible way 
of reading Trump's rallies, and his campaign more generally, would be as pure 
entertainment.  To adapt a pithy phrase from a former Australian prime minister, 
Trump simply 'threw the switch to vaudeville'.93 
Sometimes entertainment can have cognitive content.  It does in the case of 
satirical skits or jokes, for example.94  Perhaps certain of the entertainment aspects of 
Trump's campaign, too, contain the kernels of some genuine truths.95  Clearly, 
participants' sense of identity can sometimes be accurately represented and 
reinforced (as well, of course, as being sometimes created de novo) through pep 
rallies, whether high school football teams or for presidential candidates.  If the 
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94 People are counting on that heavily in the wake of Trump's victory:  as the cover of Atlantic Monthly 
put it, 'Can Satire Save the Republic?' (C. Jones 2017).  
95 That is to say, maybe they were akin to the 'true fictions' discussed in section 21.7.2 below. 
entertainment aspects of the Trump campaign somehow accurately conveyed the 
interests, values or priorities between the candidate and his audience, then perhaps a 
CJT story of sorts can be told about them for that reason as well (along the lines of 
chapter 13 and section 21.4 above).   
Insofar as people embraced the Trump campaign 'just for fun', however, they 
were simply not being serious.96  And from an epistemic point of view, their votes 
for their favourite performer should not be taken seriously, in deciding who should 
occupy a far more consequential role than that. 
 
 
21.7.  Epistemic Insouciance 
 
Why did voters let political actors get away with falsehoods and lies? Quassim 
Cassam has coined the helpful term 'epistemic insouciance'.  'Insouciance in the 
ordinary sense [suggests] unconcern, carelessness or indifference.' Epistemic 
insouciance, 'the form of insouciance to which,' Cassam believes, 'some politicians 
are prone, is indifference or unconcern with respect to whether their claims are 
adequately grounded in reality or in the best available evidence.'97   
Harry Frankfurt more prosaically calls it 'bullshit'.  Here is how he 
distinguishes that from lying (what Cassam would call 'epistemic malevolence', the 
subject of the section 21.9 below): 
When an honest man speaks, he says only what he believes to be true; and for 
the liar, it is correspondingly indispensable that he consider his statements to 
be false.  For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off:  he is neither on the 
side of the true nor on the side of the false.  His eye is not on the facts at all, ... 
except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with 
                                              
96 Mel Brooks describes Trump as 'just a song-and-dance man' who 'didn't expect to win' the election.  
'He didn't take it seriously.  Three hundred million Americans didn't take it seriously.  Now 
they do' (quoted in Queenan 2017). 
97 Cassam 2016, p. 2. 
what he says.  He does not care whether the things he says describe reality 
correctly.  He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.98 
 
Donald Trump displays this attitude in spades.99  He simply 'doesn't seem to 
care whether [his assertions] can be proven false five minutes later'.100   
Donald Trump either cannot tell the difference between truth and lies, or he 
knows the difference but does not care. Tiniest example: On a single day 
during the campaign, Trump claimed that the National Football League had 
sent him a letter complaining that the presidential-debate schedule conflicted 
with NFL games (which the NFL immediately denied), and then he said the 
Koch brothers had begged him to accept their donations (which they also flat-
out denied). 
 
Most people would hesitate before telling easily disprovable lies like these, much 
as shoplifters would hesitate if the store owner is looking at them. Most people 
are fazed if caught in an outright lie. But in these cases and others, Trump 
never blinked. .... David Fahrenthold (and Robert O’Harrow) of The Washington 
Post offered astonishing documentation [from his testimony in a 2007 lawsuit 
he had brought against an unflattering biographer] of Trump being caught in a 
long string of business-related lies and simply not caring.101 
 
Here of course we are concerned to explain the outcomes of the Brexit 
referendum and the 2016 US presidential election.  Hence, we are concerned with the 
attitudes not only of leaders but also of their followers.  To what extent might the 
success of campaigns based on lies in those two cases reflect 'epistemic insouciance' 
on the part of voters, as well as of their leaders?102 
Consider what it would mean, for the Condorcet Jury Theorem, if that were 
thoroughgoingly true.  If voters were completely indifferent to the truth when 
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99 Frankfurt (2016) himself supposes Trump more often to be lying, on the grounds that he either 
knew or could and should have known his statements were untrue.  But by Frankfurt's own 
definition, someone can remain a bullshitter whilst saying all sorts of things knowing them to 
be untrue, just so long as he does not say them because they are untrue. 
100 Fallows in Rehm (2016b).  See similarly Swift's (1710) description of English politicians of his day. 
101 Fallows 2016.  Fahrenthold and O'Harrow 2016. 
102 We analyze the related phenomenon of 'epistemic agnosticism' among the mass public in section 
21.10 below. 
casting their ballots, then no epistemic claims can be made on behalf of the outcome 
of the voting.  The fact that the majority voted one way or another would be of 
epistemically no moment, if voters were not even trying to track the truth in the way 
that they voted. 
To foreshadow:  We shall show that voters may well have displayed a fair bit of 
epistemic insouciance in both the British referendum and the American election of 
2016.  As we shall also show, however, there are various different ways of and 
reasons for being indifferent to the truth of politicians' utterances.  If voters 
displayed epistemic insouciance toward some facts but not others, then there might 
be ways in which some modest CJT-style epistemic claims for the merits of the 
majority could be vindicated.  We doubt that the empirical facts are such in order for 
them to be so; but we acknowledge it as possible. 
 
 
21.7.1.  Voters Were Indifferent on the Topics of the Lies 
 
One version of the epistemic insouciance argument connects with our discussion of 
people's 'different priorities' in section 21.4 above, and we can dismiss it equally 
quickly.   
The speculation here is that voters may have been prepared to overlook certain 
of politicians' lies because they were indifferent to the things about which the 
politicians were caught lying.  Perhaps people just did not care about those things; 
and they thought the politicians were actually telling truth on those matters that 
genuinely concerned them. As one commentator speculated, 'Who cared if Trump 
denied sexually harassing women, when he was so boldly telling the truth about the 
fear, rage, racism, xenophobia and misogyny that many of his supporters felt but 
had hesitated to voice?'103  This is an argument often advanced by Trump's 
surrogates (albeit sometimes in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary).104   
That explanation does not particularly ring true of the 2016 American election, 
however.  The reason is simply that Trump lied about so very many things, it is hard 
to believe that any given voter simply did not care about any of them.  Indeed, 
impartial factcheckers caught him lying about virtually every issue central to his 
campaign.105  Trump did not lie just about things of peripheral interest to his 
supporters.  His lies would have undercut all the central messages of his own 
campaign, or anyway they would have done so for anyone prepared to accept 
incontrovertible evidence from impartial factcheckers. 
Neither does this explanation ring particularly true of the Brexit referendum.  
According to post-referendum polling, the lie upon which we have here been 
focusing – that the UK was sending £350m per week to the EU – was the principal 
reason behind the votes of fully one in five of Leave voters, and presumably at least 
a secondary consideration for a great many others.106  Again, what was being lied 
about was hardly a peripheral issue for Leave voters. 
 
 
                                              
103 Quoted in Prose 2016.  Another woman, asked 'about the impact on her daughter of potentially 
having someone in the White House who brags about groping women's genitals', replied:  'I'll 
teach my own daughter to be independent and stand up for herself; that's my job, not the 
president's' (quoted in Pilkington 2016). 
104 Reneging on Trump's campaign promise to release his tax returns as soon as his IRS audit was 
over, his spokesperson Kellyanne Conway announced two days after his inauguration that 
'he's not going to release his tax returns' explaining, 'People don't care'.  A Washington Post-
ABC poll just the week before 'showed that Trump’s continued refusal to release his tax 
returns continued to be an unpopular decision, with 74 percent of Americans saying he 
should make the documents public, including 53 percent of Republicans' (Wagner 2017).  
Perhaps more plausibly, Newt Gingrich said in response to Trump's disastrous first week in 
office, 'The average American isn’t paying attention to this stuff.  They are going to look 
around in late 2019 and early 2020 and ask themselves if they are doing better. If the answer’s 
yes, they are going to say, "Cool, give me some more." .... There are two things he’s got to do 
between now and 2020: He has to keep America safe and create a lot of jobs.... If he does 
those two things, everything else is noise' (quoted in Baker et al. 2017). 
105 Kessler et al. 2016. 
106 Luck 2016. 
21.7.2.  True Fictions 
 
A second version of the epistemic insouciance argument turns on a notion of 'true 
fictions'. 
Ronald Reagan – to whom Donald Trump bears many biographical and 
behavioural similarities, despite their stark ideological differences107 – was a master 
of 'true fictions'.  Reagan was forever couching his political points in terms of 
anecdotes.108  Often they were made up or half-remembered plots of movies he had 
once seen.109  The stories were apocryphal – 'of doubtful authenticity; spurious, 
fictitious, false; fabulous, mythical'.110  But they spoke to a deeper truth.  They were 
stories that 'should be true', even they were not.  Like 'myths', Reagan's false stories 
evocatively encapsulated some generalities that were arguably true, even if the 
particular anecdotes themselves were not.111   
Trump's falsehoods are importantly different in many ways from Reagan's 
anecdotes, however.112  The latter were offered purely as illustrative of some more 
general principles that were supposed to stand in their own right.  The truth of those 
general principles did not depend in any way on the truth of the anecdotes.  The 
propositions espoused in Trump's lies, in contrast, purport to provide evidentiary 
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108 As did, famously, Lincoln before him (Masur 2012). 
109 As in the case of a story he told to a 1983 meeting of Congressional Medal of Honor winners, of a 
World War II pilot who remained in his crippled airplane as it crashed rather than letting his 
injured gunner die alone.  It was in fact the storyline of a 1944 move, A Wing and a Prayer.  
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110 As in the Oxford English Dictionary definition. 
111 Hanska 2012.  For an insightful appreciation of the role that 'fanciful imagination' might play in 'the 
growth of empirical knowledge' see Novitz (1980).  See Wilson and Sperber (2012) on the 
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112 Among them, 'Reagan’s stories were often about the distant past or unspecified people illustrating 
themes he wanted to stress. Trump’s tweets, by contrast, often include falsehoods about 
recent, clearly specified events. And, unlike Trump, the more upbeat Reagan didn’t use his 
words as retribution for personal slights' (Decker 2016). 
support for the positions he espouses, in which case it genuinely does matter if (as is 
so often the case) they are palpably false. 
Another version of that sort of argument might be offered to vindicate Trump's 
lies, after a fashion.  That version is based on the notion of 'truthful hyperbole' – a 
non-sequitur that Trump (or his ghostwriter) coined in his book The Art of the Deal.113 
'The ... key to the way I promote', Trump writes, 'is bravado. I play to people’s 
fantasies.... People want to believe that something is the biggest and the greatest and 
the most spectacular.  I call it truthful hyperbole. It’s an innocent form of 
exaggeration....'114 As Aristotle says in the Poetics, when appealing to 'the vulgar' it is 
necessary for a person to 'overact his parts'.115 
 At the traditional Harvard post-mortem on the 2016 US Election, Trump's 
former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski explained that 'the problem with the 
media' is that 'you guys took everything that Donald Trump said so literally. The 
American people didn’t. They understood it.'116  As another commentator elaborates: 
When Donald Trump says he wants to build a huge wall, the media and his 
critics seem to think he is imagining something like the Great Wall of China 
stretching from Tijuana to Brownsville. But Trump’s supporters interpret his 
words differently. They hear him saying that he’s going to take a hard-line 
approach to border security and illegal immigration. He’s not going to mess 
around. So when his supporters hear him walking it back a bit—for instance, 
saying it could be a fence not a wall at places—they knew what he meant all 
along. They understood he was speaking figuratively about the wall.  
 
When he talks about ripping up trade deals, he’s not saying that he is going to 
shred the 741-page North American Free Trade Agreement and 348 pages of 
annexes. His supporters take him to mean that he is going to take a much 
tougher approach to NAFTA and other trade deals, that he is going to enforce 
trade agreements much more rigorously, and that the U.S. wasn’t going to be a 
chump any longer.117  
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As one commentator pithily puts it, 'The press takes him literally, but not 
seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.'118  Trump's supporters 
understand that he may not do everything he says, but they think he will 
nonetheless 'try to stay in the spirit of the original statement'.119 Reinforcing that 
message, Trump pledged to his legions in his unprecedentedly partisan Inaugural 
Address, 'I will never let you down.'120   
The trouble with 'truthful hyperbole' from an epistemic point of view, of 
course, is that one can never know what is the 'truthful' bit and what is the 
'hyperbole'.  Does the defence of 'truthful hyperbole' as a form of 'true fiction' 
amount to a claim that the direction of the vector is as described, and only its length 
is exaggerated?  Or is the claim that its length is as stated, but the direction might be 
a little off?  Or is the suggestion that both might be off?  And in all cases, by how 
much?  It is anyone's guess – and when the 'truthful hyperboles' are surrounded by a 
tissue of other lies, one's best guess could well be worse than random. 
 
 
21.7.3.  Actions, Not Words, Are What Matter 
 
A final version of the epistemic insouciance analysis might build on the 'trust me' 
motif discussed above.  In a catchphrase associated with Richard Nixon, a previous 
US president driven from office for duplicity, 'Watch what we do, not what we 
say'.121  It is a phrase that Trump himself obliquely invoked during the campaign in 
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order to deliberately contrast himself with 'politicians who are all talk and no 
action'.122  He set about earning the 'Man of Action' sobriquet conferred on him by 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives after their first post-election meeting by 
signing a flurry of Executive Orders during his first days in office.123 
Something like that might also have been at work behind the Brexit campaign.  
After all, referendum voters had no way of knowing what exact terms, if any, might 
be negotiated as the terms of divorce between the UK and the EU.124 Referendum 
voters might have perfectly reasonably discounted the propositional content of 
Leave campaigners (on the grounds that 'they had to say that') and instead have 
been trusting what its leaders would actually do, once the referendum campaign 
was over and their victory won. 
A similar story might be told about at least some of Trump's backers.  Here is 
one telling piece of evidence.  The Kaiser Foundation convened post-election focus 
groups involving Trump voters in Rust Belt states to discuss their views on health 
care plans.  Participants were initially asked what they disliked about Obamacare 
and what they wanted to see in any replacement plans.  Then conversations turned 
to actual Republican proposals for replacing Obamacare. 
When told Mr. Trump might embrace a plan that included these elements [of 
which they disapproved], and particularly very high deductibles, they 
expressed disbelief. They were also worried about what they called 'chaos' if 
there was a gap between repealing and replacing Obamacare. But most did not 
think that, as one participant put it, 'a smart businessman like Trump would let 
that happen'.125 
 
                                              
122 Trump 2017a. 
123 Trump 2016b.  S. Jones 2017.  Much of that action was more symbolic than real, at least in the first 
instance, insofar as many of those Executive Orders require the action of others in order to be 
implemented, and it was far from certain that that would be forthcoming (Parker and 
Sullivan 2017). 
124 Furthermore, as we said in section 21.3 above, some might have voted strategically to Leave merely 
to strengthen the UK's hand in negotiations to remain in or anyway affiliated with the EU. 
125 Altman 2017. 
Much of Trump's rhetoric has a 'trust me' character to it, and clearly many of his 
voters do.   
Asked to explain her vote for Trump the day after the election, one of his 
supporters said, 'My vote was my only way to say: I am here and I count.'126 In both 
his speech accepting the Republican nomination and in his Inaugural address, 
Trump appealed to that old Roosevelt-Nixon trope, 'the forgotten men and women', 
promising that they 'will be forgotten no longer'.127  But what exactly he would do, 
having remembered them, was always left pretty radically unspecified.128  His 
appeal was always substantially, 'trust me!'129 
In a pre-inauguration interview Kellyanne Conway, Trump's former campaign 
manager and Counselor-designate, urged people to think about Trump in just that 
way. 'Why is everything taken at face value?' she asked. 'You always want to go by 
what’s come out of his mouth rather than look at what’s in his heart.'130 The 
interviewer rudely but rightly interjected, 'How do I know what's in his heart except 
by what comes out of his mouth?'  But Trump's supporters think they know.131 
Again, there is a rational gloss that could be put on that sort of claim.  After all, 
candidates always promise many things, but as president they inevitably have to 
                                              
126 Diana Maus (61, Suffern, NY) in Kelly 2016; Garrison Keillor (2016a) quipped in reply, 'People who 
shoot up theaters may feel the same way.'  A propos the Brexit referendum, a 62-year-old 
London jobseeker explained that he ordinarily would not have voted: 'I couldn’t really care 
less about the EU.  [But] people are sick and tired of being ignored. I don’t suppose I’m the 
only one to use this opportunity. It was a chance to kick the whole establishment where it 
hurt, for us to send pain the other way. And we took it' (Martin Parker, quoted in Ryan 2016). 
127 Trump 2017a.  Schrag 1969.   
128 In his RNC acceptance speech Trump (2016a) said, 'I have visited the laid-off factory workers, and 
the communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals. These are the forgotten men 
and women of our country.'  He said he would strike better trade deals and bring 
manufacturing jobs back to America.  But how, exactly, would he do that?  That is what is 
always left awfully vague. 
129 As Joe Lockhart, President Clinton's former press secretary, observed, Trump's message in every 
post-election interviews was, 'People out there, trust me. Don't trust what you read or you 
see' (in NBC Meet the Press 2017). 
130 Blake 2017a. 
131 As one woman at a Trump rally replied when asked about some of his more questionable 
statements:  'words come out in the wrong way at times; you put your foot in your mouth' 
(quoted in Pilkington 2016) 
face situations no one could have anticipated during the campaign.  Therefore, it is 
only sensible for voters to assess candidates as much, or more, on their 'character' 
than on their specific policy proposals. Of course their assessment of a candidate's 
'character' is adduced, in no small part, from what specific policy proposals that 
candidate makes during the campaign.  But the voters' real task is to elect a person 
whom they can trust to do what they would have wanted in circumstances neither 
they nor the candidate could have foreseen.132 
Of course, in the case of Trump the standard political science term 'character' is 
unfortunate, since he is a man of reprehensible character (as even many of his most 
ardent supporters might concede).133  But on the analysis just offered, 'character' is 
anyway something of a misnomer.  It is not a question of whether the candidate is a 
good Boy Scout, or even someone you would seat next to your daughter. 'Character', 
on the analysis offered above, is really much less moralistic than that, and much 
more just a matter of 'political dispositions' – how he is likely to react in 
unanticipated political circumstances. 
Trump's voters thought that they knew the answer to that.  We have our 
doubts, given the scarcity of specifics in Trump's election campaign promises, the 
history of his firms' bankruptcies and other broken promises.  We have similar 
doubts whether Brexit voters had any good grounds for any beliefs whatsoever 
about what form Brexit might take or for trusting politicians to negotiate the deal 
that they themselves would have preferred.  But no matter. What we are trying to do 
here is merely to explain why some voters might have fallen for Trump and Brexit, 
                                              
132 Barber 1972. Hardy 2017. 
133 '[T]here is something brutally, refreshingly realistic about Trump’s manner, or about the whole 
Trump persona. He is a deeply flawed man, but he doesn’t try very hard to pretend 
otherwise. Even his most enthusiastic supporters, or many of the ones I’ve talked to, are 
happy to acknowledge Trump’s failings. They may argue about which traits are failings and 
which are mere foibles hyped by his critics, but they did not vote for him because they 
thought him scrupulously honest or because they believed his character to be unimpeachable. 
Indeed, there must be very few people on either side who believe Trump to be a thoroughly 
good man. Effective in his way, maybe. Capable of disrupting what ought to be disrupted, 
almost certainly. But good?' (Swaim 2017). 
and what it might mean for the CJT if that were indeed the true explanation of their 
victories. 
 
 
21.8.   Everyone on Facebook Agrees With Me  
 
There are many ways in which the truth might come under threat.  Some of them are 
politically innocent.  Others are more politically charged.   
First, let us consider some more innocuous versions of the story, based purely 
on natural tendencies at work within the new media environment upon which 
people increasingly depend for their news.  Perhaps it was like that way all along in 
some places (Britain with its tabloid press, for example); perhaps it was like that in 
other eras.134 But in mid-twentieth-century America, anyway, everyone tended to get 
their news primarily from the same handful of broadcast and print media, which by 
and large held to high standards of neutrality and impartiality; their reports were 
authoritative, and generally taken to be such by the population at large.135  With the 
rise of the internet and especially of platforms, however, that is decreasingly true.136   
                                              
134 Newton and Brynin 2001.  Francis Bacon commented similarly in 1620 about his generation's 
equivalent of 'information bubbles' in Novum Organum (Floridi 2016). 
135 Thus, after Walter Cronkite's 1968 post-Tet broadcast saying that he thought the Vietnamese war 
would not be won, President Johnson said to his aides, 'If I've lost Cronkite I've lost middle 
America' (Martin 2009).  Cross-national studies continue to show that exposure to public 
service broadcasting increases citizens' knowledge of current affairs, compared to exposure to 
commercial broadcasting (Soroka et al. 2013).  
136 Berry and Sobieraj 2011.  Indeed, 'In the final three months of the US presidential campaign, the 
top-performing fake election news stories on Facebook generated more engagement than the 
top stories from major news outlets such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Huffington 
Post, NBC News, and others.... During these critical months of the campaign, 20 top-
performing false election stories from hoax sites and hyperpartisan blogs generated 8,711,000 
shares, reactions, and comments on Facebook. Within the same time period, the 20 best-
performing election stories from 19 major news websites generated a total of 7,367,000 shares, 
reactions, and comments on Facebook' (Silverman 2016).  According to its preamble, this is 
what motivated a bill introduced into the California state legislature immediately after the 
2016 US election to require school children be taught how to recognize fake news (Dodd 
2017). 
People now get much of their 'news' from more boutique sources, tailored to 
their own particular interests and perspectives.  To some extent they do so 
deliberately. Cass Sunstein entered a prescient warning that future internet users 
would be able to construct their very own personalized news feed, 'Daily Me', that 
told them only what they were interested in and wanted to hear.137  Today, search 
engine and social network algorithms (more of which below) do that for you.  But 
people still deliberately choose, in similar fashion, whom to include as their 
Facebook friends and which Twitter feeds to follow.138   
In part, it is merely a matter of people’s 'likes'.  You can obviously 'like' 
something (find it interesting or amusing) without believing for a moment that it is 
true.  But self-sorting based on 'likes' sometimes has an epistemic side to it as well.  
People are not unreasonably inclined to give more credibility to reports coming from 
people they deem to be trustworthy, understood as believing other things that they 
themselves also believe to be true.139 
Another driver of that phenomenon is purely commercial.  The algorithms 
underpinning Google and other search engines are designed to show people web 
pages that are similar in relevant respects to those that they have previously viewed 
– in no small part in the hopes someone who has purchased something from a 
previous web site will be tempted to make similar purchases from subsequent ones 
as well, or at least stay on similar pages to see more adverts controlled by the engine 
or network.  Commercially, that makes perfectly good sense.  And from the point of 
view of the customer – or even those who are just using the search engine to find 
related material, with no intention of buying anything – that feature of the search 
engine is genuinely to be welcomed.   
                                              
137 Sunstein 2001, pp. 3-23; 2017a.  Jamieson and Cappella 2008.  Lelkes, Sood and Iyengar 2017. 
138 And, at least on some evidence (Bakshy et al. 2015), that reduces exposure to differing political 
perspectives even more than the operation of algorithms alone – although still far from 
eliminating it completely. 
139 This is a variation on Hume's (1777) argument 'On Miracles':  if someone tells you he just saw 
someone walking on water, do you upgrade your belief in miracles or downgrade your 
estimation of that person's credibility as a reporter of true facts? 
From an epistemic point of view, however, those search engine algorithms are 
a disaster.  They create information 'bubbles', in which a person perpetually gets fed 
new information that reinforces the information he initially received, however 
idiosyncratic and unrepresentative the original bit of information.140  People who 
once searched for information on conspiracy theories keep getting fed more and 
more conspiracy theories, and so on.  'The net result', as the inventor of the internet 
Tim Berners-Lee observes, 'is that these sites show us content they think we’ll click 
on – meaning that misinformation, or fake news, which is surprising, shocking, or 
designed to appeal to our biases can spread like wildfire.'141 
The strength of those algorithms is well captured by this anecdote from 
internet activist Tom Steinberg, posted on Facebook immediately after the Brexit 
referendum result was announced: 
I am actively searching through Facebook for people celebrating the Brexit 
leave victory, but the filter bubble is SO strong, and extends SO far into things 
like Facebook's custom search that I can't find anyone who is happy *despite 
the fact that over half the country is clearly jubilant today* and despite the fact 
that I'm *actively* looking to hear what they are saying.142 
 
There is another driver of that phenomenon which, while not exactly 'innocent', 
is at least not politically motivated.  People are rewarded more, both psychologically 
and financially, the more other people who click on their websites or share their 
internet postings.  That incentivizes people to post fabulous, sensational, incredible 
stories – whether true or not – purely as 'clickbait'.143   
                                              
140 Pariser (2011) coined the term 'filter bubble', but nowadays the term is rife.  See, e.g., Ash (2016) 
and more generally O'Neil (2016).  For a rich empirical analysis of how a 'Breitbart-led right-
wing media ecosystem' created an almost hermetically sealed bubble for Trump supporters 
during the 2016 US presidential election, see Benkler et al. (2017). 
141 Quoted in Solon 2017.  For a sustained analysis of how homogenous clusters of users ('echo 
chambers') facilitate the spread of misinformation on the internet, see Vicario et al. (2016). 
142 Steinberg 2016. 
143 Ohlheiser 2016.  Stories abound.  One is of two unemployed restaurant workers who signed on as 
writers to the alt-right website LibertyWritersNews with 300,000 Facebook followers in the 
month before the 2016 election, and who 'say they are making so much money that they feel 
uncomfortable talking about it because they don’t want people to start asking for loans' 
Such clickbaiters are pure 'bullshitters', in Harry Frankfurt's sense above.  
Unlike others (who will be the subject of section 21.9 below), these clickbaiters do 
not deliberately post stories that they know to be false – certainly anyway they do 
not deliberately post them because of their known falsehood. Instead, those 
clickbaiters simply do not care about the truth of their posts, one way or another.144  
But in not caring, of course, they end up posting a good deal of information that is 
patently false.145   
Shortly after the 2016 US presidential election, Google and Facebook 
announced they were taking steps to ban fake news sites and deprive them of 
advertising revenue.146 If successful, such steps may help ameliorate this particular 
part of the problem for future elections.  Obviously, however, the damage they did 
in the 2016 elections is already done.  And laudatory though it may be for Facebook 
to flag that some post is 'Disputed by 3rd party factcheckers', 'the damage of a 
popular fake-news story is usually well done by the time it is fact-checked and 
flagged'.147 
                                              
(McCoy 2016).  Another is of the small Macedonian town of Veles, home to 'more than 150 
domains' dedicated to generating fake news for profit. 
144 As Neetzan Zimmerman, a sometime Gawker specialist in viral stories, says, 'Nowadays it is not 
important if a story's real.  The only thing that really matters is whether people click on it.  If 
a person is not sharing a news story, it is, at its core, not news' (quoted in Viner 2016). 
145 One prominent hoaxter, Paul Horner, posted false news hoping it would get picked up by Trump 
supporters, exposed and then make then look bad. Needless to say, that backfired.  As he 
explained, 'I just wanted to make fun of that insane belief, but it took off. They actually 
believed it.  I thought they’d fact-check it, and it’d make them look worse.... [T]hat’s how this 
always works: someone posts something I write, then they find out it’s false, then they look 
like idiots. But Trump supporters — they just keep running with it! They never fact-check 
anything! Now he’s in the White House. Looking back, instead of hurting the campaign, I 
think I helped it. And that feels [bad]' (quoted in Dewey 2016). 
146 Isaac 2016.  Wingfield et al. 2016.  Naughton 2017.  Persily 2017, pp. 72-5.  Weedon, Nuland and 
Stamos 2017. 
147 Persily 2017, p. 73.  That is particularly likely because of the slow process by which Facebook refers 
items for factchecking:  'Facebook is working with five fact-checking organizations – ABC 
News, AP, FactCheck.org, Politifact and Snopes – to launch the initiative. If enough of 
Facebook’s users report a story as fake, the social network will pass it onto these third parties 
to scrutinize. If a story is deemed to fail the fact check, it will be publicly flagged as “disputed 
by 3rd party fact-checkers” whenever it appears on the social network' (Jamieson and Solon 
2017). 
In consequence of all these factors, people experience 'alternative realities' on 
the internet.  What one person reasonably believes, given the information that he 
obtains there, can be radically different to what another person with a different 
internet experience might equally reasonably believe.  As President Obama once 
quipped, 'If I watched Fox I wouldn’t vote for me!'148  In his Farewell Address, 
Obama bemoaned the creation of these 'alternative realities' in the following terms: 
[I]ncreasingly we become so secure in our bubbles that we start accepting only 
information, whether it’s true or not, that fits our opinions, instead of basing 
our opinions on the evidence that is out there....  In the course of a healthy 
debate, we [rightly] prioritize different goals, and the different means of 
reaching them. But without some common baseline of facts, without a 
willingness to admit new information and concede that your opponent might 
be making a fair point, and that science and reason matter, ... we’re going to 
keep talking past each other.149 
This is indeed an unfortunate outcome.  But, as we have here seen, there are 
some relatively innocent reasons that it might have occurred.  There are also, 
however, some much less innocent drivers, to which we now turn. 
 
 
21.9.  Epistemic Malevolence 
 
There are various more politically charged ways in which the truth can come under 
threat.  One familiar way is through 'epistemic populism' – political leaders telling 
people to ignore reliable sources of information and to trust their own instincts.150  
                                              
148 Obama 2016. 
149 He went on to say that the 'selective sorting of the facts. It’s self-defeating because, as my mom 
used to tell me, reality has a way of catching up with you'; one can but hope it is so (Obama 
2017; see similarly Obama 2016). 
150 That is what was involved when Trump told people to ignore the mainstream news media and to 
trust whatever they find on the internet (Borchers 2016; Swan 2016). That pattern appears in a 
pre-Brexit referendum interview with Michael Gove:  the interviewer challenged Gove to 
defend his advocacy of Leaving the EU when so many economists, business and labour 
leaders and even the Chief Executive of the NHS 'all say that you... are wrong'; Gove's reply 
was that 'I think the people of this country have had enough of experts' (quoted in Islam 
Another familiar way is through 'epistemic authoritarianism' – a political leader 
telling people, after the fashion of Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-four, that the truth just is 
whatever he or she says it is.151  Here we shall concentrate on a third way, which we 
call 'epistemic malevolence'.152 The malevolence here in view is instead targeted at 
facts as such—it is the aim to prevent true facts from emerging at all, or to prevent 
them from getting widespread currency if they do. 
On the first full day of his presidency, Trump went to the CIA and gave a 
rambling address that was highly inappropriate in ever so many ways.  Among 
other things, he claimed in it that more people attended his inauguration than any 
other – which was blatantly untrue, as was evident from photographs that had 
already been published offering a side-by-side comparison of his inaugural audience 
and Obama's first.153  Later that day, his press secretary went down to the White 
House pressroom and reiterated that lie in no uncertain terms.154   
The next day, Trump's former campaign manager and new White House 
Counselor, Kellyanne Conway, was asked: 'Why put [the Press Secretary] out there 
for the very first time... to utter a provable falsehood' about the size of the crowd at 
the inauguration? 'It's a small thing.  But the first time he confronts the public it's a 
falsehood?'  Conway offered this memorable reply:  'You're saying it's a falsehood.... 
                                              
2016b). The British Election Study's (2016) post-referendum survey showed that Gove's 
reading of the mood of the electorate, or at least of Leave voters, was indeed correct:  the 
probability of voting to Leave was strongly associated with agreement to the proposition, 'I'd 
rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts.'  
151 Putin today (Kovalev 2017), and Stalin before him (Arendt 1967/1977), are perhaps the clearest 
exemplars.  But Trump's insistently reasserting claims that have been factchecked and shown 
to be clearly false smacks of that.  So too does the comment of his former campaign manager 
and Counselor-designate, Kellyanne Conway, when replying to a question at the Harvard 
post-election conference about whether Trump's behaviour really is 'presidential behaviour':  
'He's the president elect so that's presidential behavior' (quoted in Sullivan 2016).  But 
perhaps former New York Times editor Bill Keller is right to suggest that the most chilling 
evidence is to be found in Trump's bare-faced lying in his January 2017 speech at the CIA:  
'He was spouting obvious falsehoods to an audience for whom facts are matters of life and 
death. The implicit, and truly dangerous, message to the intelligence community was "don’t 
bring me bad news; just tell me we’re winning"' (quoted in Farhi 2017b). 
152 Baehr 2010. Cassam 2016. 
153 Trump 2017c. Rucker et al. 2017.   
154 Kessler 2017c. 
[O]ur press secretary gave alternative facts to that.'  The incredulous interviewer 
rightly pressed her on that:  'Wait a minute. Alternative facts? ... Four of the five facts 
he uttered were just not true.  Look, alternative facts are not facts.  They are 
falsehoods.'155  And clearly they were:  the claims of the president and press secretary 
were contradicted by the photographs156; they were contradicted by official Metrorail 
ridership statistics157; and so on. 
Why on earth would any president deliberately engage in such behaviour, in 
his very first day in office?158  With Trump, who knows?  It might be that a fragile 
nouveau riche ego, already deeply suspecting it is somewhere it does not belong, 
simply cannot bear the thought of being associated with anything demeaned as 
'small'.159  Or maybe Trump really believes his own lies – maybe his grip on reality 
truly is just that infirm.160  Or maybe he is using his preposterous tweets as a 
smokescreen to distract from the many nefarious policies put in place through 
executive orders signed on the same days.161  Or perhaps Trump is just deploying the 
political equivalent of 'an old sports strategy:  foul so much in the first 5 min of the 
                                              
155 Sinderbrand 2017.  Sean Spicer, the White House press secretary, made a similar Freudian slip in a 
news conference, saying, 'I think sometimes we can disagree with the facts'; but it seems clear 
from context that what he really meant to say was that we can disagree about the facts (Blake 
2017c). It is far less clear from context that what Conway really means to say was 'additional' 
(rather than 'alternative') facts, as she subsequently rather disingenuously claimed (Pengelly 
2017). 
156 Kessler 2017b. 
157 The press secretary admitted as much in his first formal news conference – the first one in which he 
actually took questions rather than merely having a rant – two days later (Blake 2017c). 
158 Cowen (2017) offers yet another speculation:  'By requiring subordinates to speak untruths, a leader 
can undercut their independent standing, including their standing with the public, with the 
media and with other members of the administration. That makes those individuals grow 
more dependent on the leader and less likely to mount independent rebellions against the 
structure of command.' 
159 Amis 2016. 
160 Rubin 2017.  His first television interview post-inauguration, imploring the interviewer to examine 
all his framed photos of his inauguration crowd, certainly sounded like Nixon at his most 
needful petitioning Kissinger to join him on his knees in prayer (Johnson 2017).  Freeman 
(2017) comments similarly on Trump's 'neediness', jocularly via a commentary on the length 
of his neckties. 
161 Balz 2017.  Dionne 2017.   
game that the refs can't call them all.  From then on, [you're free to play] a more 
physical game.'162  
Another far more nefarious explanation is also consistent with much that 
Trump has done and said, however.   That explanation certainly seems to fit the 
intentions of many of Trump's protégées and backers.  Conspicuous among them is 
Stephen Bannon, Trump's campaign manager who became for a time Chief Strategist 
in his White House, who had previously been chief executive of the alt-right 'news' 
site Breitbart.  Also included among 'Trump's backers' deploying this strategy are 
Russian officials and agents, if the US Director of National Intelligence's report is to 
be trusted.163 
The strategy in question involves the intentional promulgation of false stories, 
knowing them to be false, and doing so precisely because you know them to be 
false.164  If people actually believe the false story in support of your preferred 
position, so much the better.165  But the larger aim of promulgating fake news is 
                                              
162 Sally Jenkins, quoted in Cillizza 2017. 
163 US Director of National Intelligence 2017. 
164 For just one example, from literally thousands, consider the 'fake news masterpiece' concocted by 
Cameron Harris, since fired from his position as an aide to a Republican state legislator in 
Maryland.  During the autumn of 2016 when Trump was behind in the polls and preparing 
his supporters for defeat by asserting the election was being rigged, Harris concocted the 
story, 'Tens of thousands of fraudulent Clinton votes found in Ohio warehouse'.  Harris was 
himself surprised by the success of the story that netted him $1000 per hour he invested in it:  
'Given the severe distrust of the media among Trump supporters, anything that parroted 
Trump’s talking points people would click. Trump was saying "rigged election, rigged 
election". People were predisposed to believe... At first it kind of shocked me — the response 
I was getting.  How easily people would believe it. It was almost like a sociological 
experiment' (Shane 2017). 
165 Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) find that 'of the known false news stories that appeared in the three 
months before the election, those favoring Trump were shared a total of 30 million times on 
Facebook, while those favoring Clinton were shared eight million times' and that 'the average 
American saw and remembered 0.92 pro-Trump fake news stories and 0.23 pro-Clinton fake 
news stories, with just over half of those who recalled seeing fake news stories believing 
them'.  They attempt to minimize the impact of that fake news, however, by saying, 'for fake 
news to have changed the outcome of the election, a single fake article would need to have 
had the same persuasive effect as 36 television campaign ads'.  But that may not be as 
implausible as it sounds. People notoriously discount paid political advertisements.  And, in 
any case, they see an awful lot of them. The same source upon which Allcott and Gentzkow 
(2017) base their calculation also reports that, on average, each person in the study saw 75 
independent of people actually believing it.  The aim is instead simply to discredit, 
in the eyes of your followers, all sources of information, true or false.  As one 
commentator puts it, 'It's not an information war.  It's a war on information.'166   
This is a strategy that has been pursued by certain fragments of the American 
right for some time, and with devastating effect on public trust in the mainstream 
media.167  The strategy was taken to even further extremes by Breitbart 'News' under 
the leadership of Stephen Bannon.168  Trump powerfully associated himself with that 
strategy, not only during the campaign but also as president when declaring – in the 
first official non-ceremonial fixture of his presidency, an address to the CIA no less – 
that 'I have a running war with the media.  They are among the most dishonest 
human beings on Earth.'169 
No doubt in part this is an attempt at muzzling the press.  In an interview with 
the New York Times the very first week of the Trump Administration, Bannon 
declared – telling the interviewer 'I want you to quote this' – that the media is 'the 
opposition party'.  He added, 'the media should... keep its mouth shut and just listen 
                                              
advertisements during a presidential election campaign and 'in some areas..., voting-aged 
adults see as many as 339 spots' (Spenkuch and Toniatti 2016, p. 11). 
166 Peter Pomerantsev, quoted in Ignatius 2016. 
167 Jamieson and Cappella 2008.  Gallup Polls have a series of polls asking Americans, 'How much 
trust and confidence do you have in the mass media – such as newspapers, TV and radio – 
when it comes to reporting the news fully, accurately and fairly?'  The proportion of 
respondents saying 'a great deal' or 'a fair amount' ranged in the low-to-mid 50% range until 
2004, at which point it dropped to 44%; it trended downward since then, dipping particularly 
in election years, standing at just 40% in 2015 (Riffkin 2015). 
168 As the former spokesperson for Breitbart said in interview, 'There is no question that Trump’s 
confrontational and combative tone towards the media is choreographed by Bannon. It’s 
textbook Breitbart. If the facts aren’t on your side, attack the gatekeepers of the facts. ... From 
Team Trump’s perspective, ...their objective will be to cast as much doubt as possible on 
traditional sources of information to ensure the environment is ripe for them to win in 2020' 
(Kurt Bardella, quoted in Farhi 2017b). 
169 Trump (2017b), echoing rhetoric throughout his campaign (Baron 2016). 
for a while'.170  In an interview the next day the president himself endorsed Bannon's 
sentiments.171 
But the success of the larger strategy does not depend in any way upon the 
media itself going silent.  Nor does it depend upon succeeding in persuading people 
to get their news from the internet, which is much more of a hotbed of Trump-
friendly fake news, rather than the mainstream media (although Trump encourages 
that, too172).  The larger strategy is simply to instill widespread distrust in all sources 
of information – including the evidence of one's own eyes (as in the case of the side-
by-side photos of the crowds at Trump's and Obama's inaugurations).173   
From the perspective of this strategy, that is the real point of generating false 
news as was so widely done by various agents throughout the 2016 US election 
campaign and around the world, perhaps by Russian agents among many others.174  
The point is not so much to persuade people to believe them (although perhaps so 
much the better, from the point of view of the purveyors, if people do) as to dull 
people's sensitivity to truth in any form.175  It is a strategy that, in US politics, dates 
                                              
170 Grynbaum 2017b. 
171 Wagner 2017.  Trump followed up on that, tweeting:  'Somebody with aptitude and conviction 
should buy the FAKE NEWS and failing @nytimes and either run it correctly or let it fold 
with dignity' (Farhi 2017a). 
172 Trump constantly told his rallies, 'Forget the press, read the internet....  I... get a lot of honesty over 
the internet...  Study over things.  Don't go for the mainstream media' (Borchers 2016). 
173 This particular variant on the strategy has come to be known as 'gaslighting' after the 1938 play and 
later movie of the same name (Gibson 2017). 
174 Connolly et al. 2016.  Reuters 2017. The Pope himself equated 'fake news' to '"coprophilia 
 – an abnormal interest in excrement. Those reading or watching such stories risked behaving 
like coprophagics, people who eat faeces, he added' (Sherwood 2016). 
175 According to a RAND Corporation analysis, that is how the current Russian propaganda model 
works:  'either through more direct persuasion and influence or by engaging in obfuscation, 
confusion and the disruption or diminution of truthful reporting and messaging' (Paul and 
Matthews 2016, pp. 1-2).  'They’re not trying to say that their version of events is the true one. 
They’re saying: "Everybody’s lying! Nobody’s telling you the truth!"' (Richard Stengel, 
sometime managing editor of Time magazine and US Under Secretary of State for Public 
Diplomacy and Public Affairs, quoted in Ignatius 2016). 
back at least to George W. Bush's White House and its public relations guru, Karl 
Rove.176  
What James Fallows calls 'the chaos-generating logic of Trump’s seemingly 
illogical stream of nonstop lies big and small' can be traced, more recently, 'to reality 
TV, to Breitbart and Steve Bannon, and to Vladimir Putin’s advisor Vladislav 
Surkov'.177  The latter's strategy is particularly instructive: 
[O]riginally from the avant-garde art world...., [w]hat Surkov has done is to 
import ideas from conceptual art into the very heart of politics.  His aim is to 
undermine peoples' perceptions of the world, so they never know what is 
really happening. Surkov turned Russian politics into a bewildering, constantly 
changing piece of theater. ...[N]o one was sure what was real or fake. As one 
journalist put it: "It is a strategy of power that keeps any opposition constantly 
confused."  [He creates] a ceaseless shape-shifting that is unstoppable because it 
is undefinable.178 
 
That is of a cloth with Trump's media strategy:  the combination of empty spectacle, 
empty words, discrediting everyone, crediting conspiracy theories without any 
evidence, hogging attention and 'gaslighting' makes it hard for people to know what, 
if anything, to believe to be true.179 
The clearest expression of this attitude came in a post-election panel discussion 
on NPR in which CNN commentator and ardent Trump advocate Scottie Nell 
Hughes famously said: 'facts, they're not really facts... There's no such thing... 
anymore [as] facts'.180  Although she subsequently claimed she had misspoken, the 
Atlantic's James Fallows rightly replied, 'I think it actually is an intended result of 
                                              
176 Whom Fallows (2016) assumes to be the unnamed 'senior advisor to Bush' who belittled 'what we 
call the reality-based community', saying:  'That's not the way the world really works 
anymore," he continued. "We're an empire now, and ... we create our own reality. And while 
you're studying that reality – judiciously, as you will – we'll act again, creating other new 
realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors 
... and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do' (Suskind 2004). 
177 Fallows 2016. 
178 Curtis 2014. 
179 Yuhas 2017. 
180
this campaign and administration to [make people] think, well, really there aren't 
any facts, it's all opinion... I believe that the job for the media and civil society now is 
essentially to say there are such things as facts. So the line may be drawn here.'181  
The larger strategy is to 'disempower institutions that protect the truth'.182 
President Trump took to Twitter to declare, 'The FAKE NEWS media... is not my 
enemy, it is the enemy of the American people'183; and among those who had voted 
for him, 88% agreed.184  Retired Gen. Michael Hayden, one time head of both the CIA 
and NSA, describes this as 'a systematic effort to invalidate and delegitimize all the 
institutions, governmental and nongovernmental, that create the factual basis for 
action ... so they won’t push back against arbitrary moves'.185 
Part and parcel of that strategy is for its practitioners to appropriate the term 
'false news' themselves and to apply it indiscriminately to any reports that they do 
not like, be they true or false.186  Thus, for example, when CNN reported that 
                                              
181 Fallows in Rehm (2016b). Later in the discussion Hughes backed off the 'no facts' claim to say that 
'any facts that they might be able to report nobody believes because [the reporter has] 
interlaced his opinion' in his reports of the facts.  She gives an example:  'look at reports ... [in 
outlets] like Daily Caller, Breitbart, Washington Times, ... and you will say those are not facts.  
Well guess what? It's a two-sided mirror because they say the same about your reporting.'  
And in a subsequent follow-up she added, 'My comment was that if you were a Trump 
supporter, you believed the words his campaign was saying were fact. If you were a Clinton 
supporter, you believed the words her campaign were stating was fact. However, both sides 
did not believe nor acknowledge the other as fact. Just like in a court of law where both sides 
honestly believe they are right. When a prosecutor comes in he states his "facts" of the case. 
The Defense Attorney does the same. It is up to the jury to decide what is the truth. Of course 
I believe there are facts in this world; what I was referencing, as I stated, was in regards to 
this campaign cycle. Facts to one side were seen as opinion or untrue to the other' (Hughes, in 
Stelter 2016). 
182 Douglas 2017.  And it works, at least according to the editor of one small-town Michigan 
newspaper, who said, 'You can give readers 50 facts that show that Trump is wrong, but 
when he portrays us in the media industry as the bad guys, that seems to outweigh all those 
facts' (Jeff Payne quoted in Pilkington 2017). 
183 Grynbaum 2017a. 
184 Sargent 2017b.  
185 Gersen 2017. 
186 President Trump candidly tweeted, 'Any negative polls are fake news' (Marcus 2017).  In response 
to this sort of behaviour, the Washington Post (2017) editorialized, 'So overused and misused 
is the phrase ['fake news'] – by those seeking to disparage things they simply dislike or 
disagree with – that it loses real meaning.'  See similarly: Blake 2017b; Borchers 2017; Sullivan 
2017b.   
President-Elect Trump had been briefed by the US intelligence community that 
Russia had assembled a dossier of embarrassing material that might render him 
vulnerable to blackmail, Trump responded by accusing CNN of promulgating 'fake 
news'.187  While it may well be the case that the contents of the dossier are not true 
(the CNN made no claim that they were), there was nothing remotely 'fake' about 
the news report of the indisputable fact that Trump had received just such a briefing.  
For Trump to say otherwise simply devalues the language – which is part of this 
strategy.  Once inaugurated, Trump doubled down on his insistence that anything 
unflattering to him appearing in the mainstream media was 'fake news'.188 
A final element of the strategy of undermining truth claims altogether is for 
purveyors of lies to insist that others must accord equal epistemic respect to their 
fabrications as to the genuine evidence. The mainstream media's traditions of 
impartiality and 'equal time' serve us well epistemically when everyone honestly 
and honorably asserts only what they genuinely believe to be true.  But they serve us 
ill when people deliberately lie, asserting propositions they know to be false for 
some strategic purpose unconnected to any quest for truth.189   
There has been much debate within the mainstream media as to how best to 
cover someone like Trump.  Many old-school editors insist that 'more and better of 
the same sort of journalism as always' – more and more fact checking and so on – 
would be the best response.190  But factchecking of such transparent falsehoods is a 
soul-destroying time-suck that diverts journalists from investigations that might be 
of more consequence.191  In any case, there is a fair bit of evidence that factchecking 
pays decreasing dividends – once someone has been caught in fifty whoppers, 
                                              
187 Trump 2017b. Nossel 2017.  Wemple 2017a. 
188 Sargent 2017a.  Similarly in Sweden, a right-wing Facebook group, Mediakollen, emerged 
pretending to be a fact checker but actually serving as 'itself a tool of disinformation..., in 
effect, a fake fact checker' (Jackson 2017).  Breitbart similarly posted partial truths and patent 
falsehoods in ostensibly fact-checking the Guardian reporting about illegal immigration, 
which it disingenuously described as 'fake news' (Carroll 2016). 
189 Patterson 2016. 
190 Baron 2016.  Hiatt 2017. 
191 Wemple 2017b.  
reports of a fifty-first (even if the substance is such that, objectively, it really should 
be a very big deal) evokes very little response from the public at large.192  
Factchecking might even backfire, insofar as further reporting of the falsehood (if 
only to refute it) helps the falsehood stick in people's minds.193 
Others advise, second, that we to 'get out there with true facts first' before liars 
have a chance to spin their falsehoods.194  But liars are creative (who could have 
imagined all the sorts of falsehoods Trump would come up with?), so it seems 
impossibly hard to implement that strategy in such a way that would forestall all 
successful political lies.   
A third approach that has been mooted, but not seriously (or anyway 
systematically) attempted, would be for the press simply to boycott the White House 
pressroom of a proven liar. But that would be hard to organize a successful boycott 
among all the media actors in such a highly competitive environment.  And of 
course even if the mainstream media boycotted the White House pressroom, 
rightwing media like Fox News and Breitbart would remain.195 
A fourth approach is to educate the public in how better to detect falsehoods.  
Shortly after the 2016 election a bill was introduced into the California state 
legislature along those lines, for example.196  The OECD's director of education 
agrees that 'exposing fake news' by helping students learn how to 'distinguish... 
                                              
192 Cook and Lewandowsky 2011; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; 2015; Harford 2017.  Or worse:  Major 
Garrett of CBS News recounted how, during the 2016 presidential campaign, 'Any fact 
checking I did ... was prima facie evidence that I was biased. And that I was wrong. So fact 
checking Trump was proof, not that he was wrong, but that he was right, and that anyone 
who would raise a question about the underlying relationship between what he said in the 
facts was biased.  And therefore, [it can be] legitimately disregarded from the beginning. So it 
wasn't as if there was a conversation about this. It wasn't as if facts were litigated back and 
forth. The very raising of a question about the factual basis of a Trump assertion was proof 
you were wrong and biased. And that is the atmosphere that I found myself existing in as a 
reporter' (Garrett in Rehm 2016a). 
193 Cook and Lewandowsky 2011, p. 2. 
194 Paul and Matthews 2016, pp. 9-10. 
195 Rosen, Wemple and Downie 2017.  
196 Bever 2017. Dodd 2017.  The idea, if not the specific legislation, was endorsed by the CEO of Apple, 
Tim Cook (Rawlinson 2017). 
what is true from what is not... is something that ... schools can do something about'; 
and Sweden has already instigated such a policy.197  In the US, the Washington Post 
Fact Checker has provided an easy 'guide for detecting fake news'.198   
A fifth approach is to follow the lead of Germany and legislate to 'compel large 
outlets such as Facebook and Twitter to rapidly remove fake news that incites hate, 
as well as other “criminal” content, or face fines as high as 50 million euros ($53 
million)'.199   
A sixth approach is simply to reset the default assumption of how to respond 
to someone who has persistently been caught lying.  Whereas we ordinarily ought to 
assume that people are telling the truth unless we have evidence to the contrary, 
once we have enough evidence that some particular person persistently lies we to 
ought assume that that person is lying unless evidence is produced to the contrary.200  
 
 
21.10.  Epistemic Agnosticism  
 
The success of the strategy of epistemic malevolence just discussed depends 
crucially upon listeners mistaking epistemic saboteurs who are actually strategically 
lying to them for genuine epistemic peers.   
                                              
197 Andreas Schleicher, quoted in Siddique 2017. Priest and Birnbaum 2017. 
198 Kessler 2016b.  Sullivan 2017a. 
199 Faiola and Kirchner 2017.  See further Priest and Birnbaum 2017. 
200 As one commentator says, 'I don't believe a word he says, and neither should you' (Bernstein 2017; 
see similarly Fallows 2016).  Kellyanne Conway, Trump's former campaign manager and 
subsequently White House Counselor, said in one interview, 'We believe in a free and fair 
media, but with freedom comes responsibility. It would be great for the media to be less 
presumptively negative and skeptical and more open and honest about their past unfair and 
untoward coverage of [Trump].... I was really astonished to see respected print and electronic 
journalists outwardly admit during the campaign that Donald Trump forces them to suspend 
the objective standards of journalism' (Heim 2017).  But on this analysis, through his own 
behaviour Trump has forfeited any claim (either moral or epistemic) to be presumed to be a 
truth teller. 
The right response, when confronted with conflicting reports on some matter of 
fact that come from people whom you rightly regard as epistemic peers is often 
thought to be to 'split the difference' when you can or, when you cannot, to 'suspend 
judgment' and treat the matter as an 'open question'.201  When out of a misplaced 
sense of fairness or impartiality, or respect for someone's official position, people 
treat reports from deliberate liars in that same way, they are led – quite wrongly, 
from an epistemic point of view – to the same state of epistemic agnosticism, treating 
as open questions matters of fact that are really firmly settled.202  
The tendency to take into account false claims from others, even against your 
own better judgment, has various sources.  Some are sociological and 
psychological.203  Some may even be neurophysiological.  In fMRI studies, evidence 
has been found to suggest that the neurophysiological mechanisms that ordinarily 
inhibit lying weaken the more lies one tells.204  Extrapolating from those studies, we 
might imagine that related neurophysiological mechanisms making us resent being 
lied to weaken the more often we have been lied to.   
Be all that as it may, there is clear evidence of deep skepticism among both the 
US and UK electorates about any and all purported truth claims politicians made 
during the 2016 campaigns. Nearly half of UK voters believed that both sides were 
                                              
201 Such was the classical approach anyway, culminating perhaps with Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics:  
'the denial by another of a proposition that I have affirmed has a tendency to impair my 
confidence in its validity.... And it will be easily seen that the absence of such disagreement 
must remain an indispensable negative condition of the certainty of our beliefs. For if I find 
any of my judgements, intuitive or inferential, in direct conflict with a judgement of some 
other mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to suspect error in 
the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between the two judgements 
necessarily reduces me...to a state of neutrality' (Sidgwick 1907, bk 3, ch 11, § 2, iv).  
Contemporary commentators take more varied views on the matter; for an overview see 
Goldman and Blanchard (2015). 
202 Relentlessly negative reporting, of the sort that has become increasingly common, can have the 
same effect.  As Patterson (2016) writes, 'indiscriminate criticism has the effect of blurring 
important distinctions. Were the allegations surrounding Clinton of the same order of 
magnitude as those surrounding Trump? It’s a question that journalists made no serious 
effort to answer during the 2016 campaign.' 
203 See for example Asch (1955), Janis (1972) and the many studies that have followed on from them. 
204 Garrett et al. 2016.  Engelmann and Fehr 2016. 
'mostly telling lies' in the Brexit referendum campaign.205  Similarly in the US 
election, a Washington Post correspondent's analysis of why repeated reports of 
Trump's serial lying gained no traction among his supporters was that those people 
were thinking, 'So what if he doesn't all the time tell the truth?  Politicians never 
do.'206   
Right-wing activists have mounted a concerted effort, through pseudo-
scientific 'shadow statistics' websites, to discredit even official government statistics.  
Judging from a poll released a month before the 2016 US election, that strategy 
seems to have worked wonders:  44% of Americans said they distrust official US 
government economic data.207 The Washington Post commentator reporting this story 
describes this as 'part of his broader narrative of numerical nihilism' – and it is hard 
to see how it could be described as anything else. 
Inducing people to take an agnostic attitude toward all factual claims can be 
epistemically almost as damaging instilling beliefs in the truth of false facts.  It 
liberates those in power to implement policies that could only be justified – if they 
had to be justified, which in an environment of general epistemic agnosticism they 
do not have to be at all – by arguments based on falsehoods. 
 
 
21.11.  Conclusion: Epistemic Democracy under Threat 
 
                                              
205 Ipsos MORI 2016, p. 5.  In a post-referendum comment, Minister for Brexit, David Davis, dismissed 
the importance 'the £350m on the side of the bus' lie promulgated by the Leave campaign 
(discussed in section 21.1.1 above), saying that the voters 'dismissed those things [and] made 
their judgment on other things' (Stone 2016a). 
206 Margaret Sullivan in Rehm (2016b).  Hochschild and Einstein (2015b, pp. 607-8) quote one 
conservative commentator explaining Trump's long-standing claim that Obama was born in 
Kenya rather than the US in this way:  'what Donald Trump is doing is questioning things 
and saying, "Why do we have to just accept everything?"  To hold the birther view is to 
affiliate oneself with an attitude, not a truth claim....  Your average Trump supporter may 
[simply] think that the proper attitude to have toward America’s politicians is contempt.' 
207 Among those who reported themselves as likely to vote for Trump, 'the share is 60%, with nearly 
half saying they don't trust government economic data "at all"' (Rampell 2016). 
What, then, is the real explanation for the Trump and Brexit victories?  Probably all 
of the above, in some measure.  Our best guess (and we would claim no more 
authority for it than that) is this.  In the UK, differing priorities, values and interests 
(likely misperceived) were probably the dominant drivers.  In the US, 'fools led by 
knaves’ is probably a larger part of the story – with voters being made more foolish 
by the malicious undermining of all standards of truth, and knaves being more 
knavish for their deliberate role in so doing.  But as we say, there were almost 
certainly elements of all the explanations canvassed above at work in both countries. 
What are the implications for epistemic theories of democracy?  That voters 
might make mistakes has been part of that story all along.  And it has also long been 
recognized that even large groups of people might be mistaken when they all follow 
too uncritically the same opinion leaders.  What the events of 2016 have brought 
home with particular force is how much each of those standard caveats must be 
amplified when voters are systematically subjected to deliberate misinformation and 
efforts to undermine all bases of information. 
The next step in elaborating the epistemic theory democracy lies in finding 
ways to overcome the deleterious effects of such deliberate lies in politics.  But that is 
not a challenge for epistemic theories alone.  It is a challenge for democratic theory of 
all forms. 
  
References 
 
Allcott, Hunt and Matthew Gentzkow.  2017.  Social media and fake news in the 
2016 election.  NBER Working Paper No. 23089.  Available at  
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w23089> or 
<https://web.stanford.edu/~gentzkow/research/fakenews.pdf>. 
Altman, Drew.  2017.  The health care plan Trump voters really want.  New York 
Times, 5 Jan.; available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/05/opinion/the-
health-care-plan-trump-voters-really-
want.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-right-
region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&_r=2>. 
Amis, Martin.  2016.  Don the realtor:  the rise of Trump.  Harper's Magazine, 13 
Feb.; available at < http://harpers.org/archive/2016/08/don-the-realtor/>. 
Arendt, Hannah.  1967/1977.  Truth and politics.  New Yorker, 25 Feb., pp. 49-88.  
Reprinted pp. 227-64 in Between Past and Future.  New York: Penguin, 1977. 
Aristotle.  1965.  Poetics, trans R. Kassel.  Vol. 2, pp. 2316-40 in The Complete Works 
of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1984. 
Asch, Solomon E. 1955. Opinions and social pressure. Scientific American, 193 (#5: 
Nov.): 31-5.  
Ash, Timothy Garton. 2016.  Do you live in a Trump bubble or a Clinton bubble?  
Guardian, 29 Sept.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/29/trump-clinton-
media-left-right-democracy>. 
Ashthana, Anushka and Rowena Mason. 2016.  Gove: I did almost everything to 
avoid Tory leadership bid.  Guardian, 1 July; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/01/michael-gove-launches-
tory-leadership-bid-with-brexit-promise>. 
Atlantic.  2013.  What missile gap?  The Atlantic, Aug; available at 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/08/what-missile-
gap/309484/>. 
Australia Senate Select Committee on the Scrafton Evidence.  2004.  Report.  
Available at 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Forme
r_Committees/scrafton/report/index>. 
Baehr, Jason.  2010.  Epistemic malevolence.  Metaphilosophy, 41: 189-213. 
Baker, Gerard.  2017.  Trump, 'lies' and honest journalism:  why editors should be 
careful about making selective more judgments about false statements.  Wall 
Street Journal, 4 Jan.; available at <http://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-lies-
and-honest-journalism-1483557700>. 
Baker, Peter; Glenn Thrush and Maggie Haberman.  2017.  Rocky first weekend for 
Trump troubles even his top aides.  New York Times, 22 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/us/politics/donald-trump-aides-
rocky-first-
weekend.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=first-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-
news&_r=0>. 
Bakshy, Eytan; Solomon Messing; and Lada Adamic.  2015.  Exposure to 
ideologically diverse news and opinion on Facebook.  Science, 348 (#6239): 
1130-2. 
Balz, Dan.  2017.  Amid distractions he created, Trump moves quickly to change the 
country dramatically.  Washington Post, 28 Jan.; available at < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/amid-distractions-he-created-
trump-moves-swiftly-to-change-the-country-
dramatically/2017/01/28/2f84f884-e4e3-11e6-ba11-
63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-
politics%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.086172255968>. 
Baquet, Dean.  2016.  'New York Times' executive editor on the new terrain of 
covering Trump.  NPR Fresh Air, 8 Dec.; available at 
<http://www.npr.org/2016/12/08/504806512/new-york-times-executive-editor-
on-the-new-terrain-of-covering-trump>. 
Barber, James David.  1972.  The Presidential Character.  Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall. 
Barstow, David.  2016.  Donald Trump's deals rely on being creative with the truth.  
New York Times, 16 July; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/politics/donald-trump-
business.html>. 
Bernstein, Jared. 2017.  You can't believe what President Trump says. Washington 
Post, 23 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/01/23/breaking-
news-you-cant-believe-what-president-trump-says/?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-
card-posteverything%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.b461501d5687>. 
Berry, Jeffrey M. and Sarah Sobieraj.  2011.  Understanding the rise of talk radio.  PS: 
Political Science and Politics, 44: 762-67. 
Bever, Lindsey.  2017.  If state lawmakers have their way, California schoolchildren 
may be taught how to spot 'fake news'.  Washington Post, 12 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/12/if-state-
lawmakers-have-their-way-california-schoolchildren-may-be-taught-how-to-
spot-fake-news/?utm_term=.61266fc9c619>. 
Blake, Aaron.  2016.  Do Republicans have buyer's remorse on repealing Obamacare?  
Washington Post, 1 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/do-
republicans-have-buyers-remorse-on-repealing-
obamacare/?utm_term=.653a60e45125 >. 
Blake, Aaron. 2017a.  Kellyanne Conway's laughable 'look at what's in is heart' 
defense of Donald Trump.  Washington Post, 9 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/09/kellyanne-
conways-laughable-look-at-whats-in-his-heart-defense-of-
trump/?utm_term=.356b32c7e297>. 
Blake, Aaron.  2017b.  President Trump's simplistic, illogical worldview, in one tweet.  
Washington Post, 6 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/02/06/president-
trumps-simplistic-illogical-worldview-in-one-tweet/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-
main_fix-fake-polls-
1pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.67ce356edd01>. 
Blake, Aaron. 2017c.  Sean Spicer's defense of himself and explanation of Donald 
Trump's sensitivity, annotated.  Washington Post, 23 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/23/sean-spicers-
defense-of-himself-and-explanation-of-donald-trumps-sensitivity-
annotated/?utm_term=.95931c679d93>. 
Blake, Aaron.  2017d.  Trump voters don't have buyer's remorse.  But some Hillary 
Clinton voters do.  Washington Post, 23 April; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/04/23/trump-voters-
dont-have-buyers-remorse-but-some-hillary-clinton-voters-do/?hpid=hp_hp-
cards_hp-card-politics%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.6e75a1871a59>. 
Blumenthal, Sidney.  2016.  Abraham Lincoln would have recognized the con man 
Trump.  Newsweek, 14 Aug.; available at 
<http://europe.newsweek.com/abraham-lincoln-would-have-recognised-
conman-trump-489841?rm=eu>. 
Booth, Robert; Alan Trais; and Amelia Gentleman.  2016.  Leave donor plans new 
party to replace UKIP – possibly without Farage in charge.  Guardian, 29 
June; available at <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/29/leave-
donor-plans-new-party-to-replace-ukip-without-farage>. 
Borchers, Callum.  2016.  4 threats to the media under President Trump.  Washington 
Post, 10 Nov.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/11/10/4-threats-to-the-media-under-president-
trump/?utm_term=.30bfd3f8af9c>. 
Borchers, Callum.  2017. 'Fake news' has now lost all meaning.  Washington Post, 9 
Feb.; available at < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/02/09/fake-news-has-now-lost-all-meaning/?hpid=hp_hp-more-
top-stories_fake-news-
9am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.3240db16bdf2>. 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).  2016.  EU Referendum reality check:  
would Brexit mean extra £350m a week for NHS? 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36040060>. 
British Election Study.  2016. Brexit Britain: British Election Study insights from the 
post-EU referendum wave of the BES internet panel.  Available at 
<http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/bes-resources/brexit-britain-british-
election-study-insights-from-the-post-eu-referendum-wave-of-the-bes-
internet-panel/#.WHQKqdaYV_k>. 
Bump, Philip.  2016.  It's hard to imagine a much worse pitch Donald Trump could 
have made for the black vote.  Washington Post, 20 Aug.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/08/20/its-hard-to-
imagine-a-much-worse-pitch-donald-trump-could-have-made-for-the-black-
vote/?utm_term=.a6956fc09e58>. 
Cannon, Lou.  1991.  Ronald Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime.  New York: Simon & 
Schuster. 
Capehart, Jonathan.  2017.  Arthur Brooks:  the word dignity explains why Trump is 
president.  Washington Post, 24 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/wp/2017/01/24/arthur-brooks-the-word-dignity-explains-why-
trump-is-president/?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
c%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.ceca525c0b59>. 
Carroll, Rory.  2016.  How Breitbart and the conservative right opened a new front in 
the war over fake news.  Guardian, 15 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/dec/15/breitbart-fake-news-
right-trump>. 
Casarett, David.  2016.  The science of choosing wisely – overcoming the therapeutic 
illusion.  New England Journal of Medicine, 374: 1203-5. 
Cassam, Quassim.  2016.  Epistemic postures.  Vice Epistemology.  Mimeo., 
Department of Philosophy, University of Warwick. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).  2013.  Penetrating the Iron Curtain:  Resolving 
the Missile Gap with Technology.  Washington, DC:  Government Printing 
Office for CIA.  Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/cold-
war/resolving-the-missile-gap-with-technology>. 
Charles, Ron.  2017.  Why Orwell's '1984' matters so much now.  Washington Post, 25 
Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/books/why-orwells-1984-
matters-so-much-now/2017/01/25/3cf81964-e313-11e6-a453-
19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_bw-
orwell552pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.ec8f6783d173>. 
Cheney, Kyle; Isaac Arnsdorf; Daniel Lippman; Daniel Strauss; and Brent Griffiths. 
2016.  Donald Trump's week of misrepresentations, exaggerations and half-
truths.  Politico, 25 Sept.; available at 
<http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/09/2016-donald-trump-fact-
check-week-214287>. 
Cillizza, Chris.  2016.  How the heck can voters think Donald Trump is more honest 
than Hillary Clinton?  Washington Post, 2 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/02/donald-
trump-hasnt-told-the-truth-repeatedly-in-this-campaign-voters-still-think-
he-is-more-honest-than-hillary-clinton/?utm_term=.ac1c8206c351>. 
Cillizza, Chris.  2017.  A fascinating theory from the world of sports about Donald 
Trump's first 7 days.  Washington Post, 30 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/30/a-
fascinating-theory-from-the-world-of-sports-about-donald-trumps-
governing-style/?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-
politics%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.eb6ba4db337f>. 
CNN.  2016.  Exit polls.  CNN Politics, 23 Nov.; available at 
<http://edition.cnn.com/election/results/exit-polls>. 
Confessore, Nicholas and Karen Yourish.  2016.  $2 billion worth of free media for 
Donald Trump.  New York Times, 16 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/upshot/measuring-donald-trumps-
mammoth-advantage-in-free-media.html?_r=0>. 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO).  2017.  How repealing portions of the 
Affordable Care Act would affect health insurance coverage and premiums.  
Available at <https://www.cbo.gov/publication/52371>. 
Connolly, Kate; Angelinque Chrisafis; Poppy McPherson; Stephanie Kirchgaessner; 
Benjamin Haas, Dominic Phillips; Elle Hunt; and Michael Safi.  2016. Fake 
newws: an insidious trend that's fast becoming a global problem. Guardian, 2 
Dec.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/dec/02/fake-news-
facebook-us-election-around-the-world>. 
Cook, Charlie.  2016.  The truthful hyperbole of Donald Trump.  National Journal, 18 
Nov.; available at <https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/645222/truthful-
hyperbole-donald-trump> or < http://cookpolitical.com/story/10182>. 
Cook, John and Stephan Lewandowsky. 2011.  The Debunking Handbook.  St. Lucia, 
QLD:  University of Queensland.  Available at <http://sks.to/debunk>. 
Cowen, Tyler.  2017.  Why Trump's staff is lying.  Bloomberg View, 23 Jan.; available 
at <https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-01-23/why-trump-s-
staff-is-lying >. 
Curtis, Adam. 2014.  Charlie Brooker's 2014 wipe:  oh dearism II.  BBC, 30 Dec.; 
available at 
<http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2014/12/31/bbcs_adam_curtis_on_th
e_contradictory_vaudeville_of_post-modern_politics.html>.  
Decker, Cathleen. 2016.  Trump's Twitter falsehoods fire up his base, provoke 
opponents and distract from larger issues. Los Angeles Times, 15 Dec.; 
available at <http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-truth-
20161215-story.html>. 
Dewey, Caitlin.  2016.  Facebook fake-news writer: ‘I think Donald Trump is in the 
White House because of me’. Washington Post, 17 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
intersect/wp/2016/11/17/facebook-fake-news-writer-i-think-donald-trump-is-
in-the-white-house-because-of-me/?utm_term=.8e3b9f26071b>. 
Dickinson, Tim.  2011.  How Roger Ailes built the Fox News fear factory.  Rolling 
Stone, 25 May; available at <http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-
roger-ailes-built-the-fox-news-fear-factory-20110525>. 
Dilnot, Andrew.  2016a.  Letter to The Rt Hon Norman Lamb MP.  Available at 
<https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Letter-
from-Sir-Andrew-Dilnot-to-Norman-Lamb-MP-210416.pdf>. 
Dilnot, Andrew.  2016b.  UK Statistics Authority statement on the use of official 
statistics on contributions to the European Union.  Available at 
<https://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/news/uk-statistics-authority-
statement-on-the-use-of-official-statistics-on-contributions-to-the-european-
union/>. 
Dionne, E. J. Jr.  2017.  What's the method in Trump's madness?  Washington Post, 25 
Jan.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/whats-the-
method-in-trumps-madness/2017/01/25/3fafae32-e33c-11e6-ba11-
63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
c%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.b01b7f271b04>. 
Dean, Alex.  2016.  Which UK regions receive the most EU funding? And which of 
them voted for Brexit?  Prospect, 7 Sept.; available at < 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/politics/which-uk-regions-receive-the-
most-eu-funding>. 
Dodd, Bill.  2017.  Senate Bill No. 135, California Legislature – 2017-2018 Regular 
Session.  Available at 
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=20172018
0SB135>. 
Douglas, Lawrence.  2017.  Why Trump wants to disempower institutions that protect 
the truth.  Washington Post, 7 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/07/trump-
disempower-institutions-protect-truth>. 
Economist. 2016.  Brexit regret.  Economist, 12 Oct.; available at 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/10/daily-chart-6>. 
Ehrenfreund, Max.  2016.  The problem with Trump's question to black voters, 'What 
the hell do you have to lose'.  Washington Post, 24 Aug.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/08/24/the-
problem-with-trumps-question-to-black-voters-what-the-hell-do-you-have-
to-lose/?utm_term=.b5e4da776f21>. 
Engelmann, Jan B. and Ernst Fehr.  2016.  The slippery slope of dishonesty.  Nature 
Neuroscience, 19: 1543-4. 
Fahrenthold, David A. and Robert O'Harrow, Jr.  2016.  Trump:  a true story.  
Washington Post, 10 Aug.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/trump-
lies/>. 
Faiola, Anthony and Stephanie Kirchner.  2017. How do you stop bake news?  In 
Germany, with a law.  Washington Post, 5 Ap.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-do-you-stop-fake-
news-in-germany-with-a-law/2017/04/05/e6834ad6-1a08-11e7-bcc2-
7d1a0973e7b2_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-
world%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.dcf3a54ab5bb>. 
Fallows, James.  2016a.  How to deal with the lies of Donald Trump:  guidelines for 
the media.  The Atlantic, 28 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/2016/11/a-reflexive-liar-in-command-
guidelines-for-the-media/508832/>. 
Fallows, James.  2016b.  The daily Trump:  filling a time capsule.  Available at 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/notes/all/2016/05/the-daily-trump/484064/>. 
Farhi, Paul.  2017a.  Trump has a love-hate relationship with the New York Times. 
Now he wishes it would die.  Washington Post, 29 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trump-has-a-love-hate-
relationship-with-the-new-york-times-now-he-wishes-it-would-
die/2017/01/29/1f61e8d6-e63c-11e6-bf6f-
301b6b443624_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_weekend-
723pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.de3ce5aebe01 >. 
Farhi, Paul.  2017b.  Trump's 'war' with the media (and the facts) forced journalists to 
question their role.  Washington Post, 26 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/trumps-war-with-the-
media-and-the-facts-forces-journalists-to-question-their-
role/2017/01/26/0b710f4c-e31b-11e6-ba11-
63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.0bfd1d2013b5>. 
Fisher, Stephen D.  2004.  Definition and measurement of tactical voting: the role of 
rational choice.  British Journal of Political Science, 34: 152-66. 
Flood, Alison.  2016.  'Post-truth' named word of the year by Oxford Dictionaries.  
Guardian, 15 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/nov/15/post-truth-named-word-
of-the-year-by-oxford-dictionaries>. 
Floridi, Luciano.  2016.  Fake news and a 400-year-old problem:  we need to resolve 
the 'post-truth' crisis.  Guardian, 29 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/29/fake-news-echo-
chamber-ethics-infosphere-internet-digital>. 
Flores, Reena. 2016.  Donald Trump never threw a baby out of a rally.  CBS News, 6 
Aug.; available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/report-donald-trump-
never-threw-a-baby-out-of-a-rally/>. 
Forster, Katie.  2016.  EU referendum: thousands of commuters affected by flooding.  
The Independent, 24 June; available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/eu-referendum-
polling-stations-travel-time-extension-latest-weather-disruptions-
a7098466.html >. 
Frankfurt, Harry G.  1988.  On bullshit.  Pp. 117-34 in Frankfurt, The Importance of 
What We Care About.  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press. 
Frankfurt, Harry G.  2016.  Donald Trump is BS, says expert in BS.  Time, 12 May; 
available at < http://time.com/4321036/donald-trump-bs/>. 
Frayer, Lauren.  2016.  Boris Johnson: London's ex-mayor could be Britain's next 
prime minister.  NPR, 25 June; available at 
<http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/06/25/483414071/boris-johnson-
londons-ex-mayor-could-be-britains-next-prime-minister>. 
Freedland, Jonathan.  2016. Post-truth politicians such as Donald Trump and Boris 
Johnson are no joke.  Guardian, 14 May; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/may/13/boris-johnson-
donald-trump-post-truth-politician>. 
Freeman, Hadley.  2017.  Tie length: a worrying guide to Trump's state of mind.  
Guardian, 30 Jan; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/fashion/2017/jan/30/tie-length-a-worrying-
guide-to-trumps-state-of-mind>. 
Fritz, Ben; Bryan Keefer; and Brenden Nyhan.  2004.  All the President's Spin: George 
W. Bush, the Media and the Truth.  New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Gabbatt, Adam.  2017.  Even rightwing sites call out Trump administration over 
'alternative facts'.  Guardian, 24 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/23/rightwing-sites-trump-
administration-alternative-facts>. 
Garrett, Neil; Stephanie C. Lazzaro; Dan Ariely; and Tali Sharot.  2016.  The brain 
adapts to dishonesty.  Nature Neuroscience, 19: 1727-32. 
Gersen, Michael.  2017.  Reality will get its revenge on Donald Trump. Washington 
Post, 16 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reality-will-get-its-revenge-on-
donald-trump/2017/02/16/b24eaea6-f46d-11e6-8d72-
263470bf0401_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
c%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.28120022db7f>. 
Gettier, Edmund L.  1963.  Is justified true belief knowledge? Analysis, 23: 121-3. 
Gibson, Caitlin.  2017.  What we talk about when we talk about Donald Trump and 
'gaslighting'.  Washington Post, 27 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/what-we-talk-about-when-
we-talk-about-donald-trump-and-gaslighting/2017/01/27/b02e6de4-e330-
11e6-ba11-63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_gaslight-
3pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.9e4a2aaec61b>. 
Gillette, Felix.  2016.  Tabloid's Shocking LOVE AFFAIR with Trump Revealed!  
Bloomberg, 29 Sept.; available at 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-trump-national-enquirer/>. 
Gingrich, Newt.  2016.  The principles of Trumpism, Heritage Foundation, 13 Dec.  
Available at < https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4637292/newt-gingrich-
heritage-foundation>. 
Godfrey, Elaine. 2016. Newt Gingrich tries to explain how Trump will remake America.  
Atlantic, 17 Dec.; available at < 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/gingrich-trump-
election/510983/>. 
Goldman, Alvin and Thomas Blanchard.  2015.  Social epistemology.  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Available at 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-social/>. 
Goodin, Robert E.  1980.  Manipulatory Politics.  New Haven, CT:   Yale University 
Press. 
Goodin, Robert E.  2010.  Perverting the course of politics.  British Journal of Political 
Science, 40:  725-39. 
Grice, Andrew. 2017.  Fake news handed Brexiters the referendum – and now they 
have no idea what they're doing.  Independent, 19 Jan.; available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/michael-gove-boris-johnson-brexit-
eurosceptic-press-theresa-may-a7533806.html>. 
Griffin, Andrew. 2016.  Brexit:  Vote Leave wipes NHS £350m claim and rest of its 
website after EU referendum.  Independent, 27 June; available at < 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-vote-leave-
wipes-nhs-350m-claim-and-rest-of-its-website-after-eu-referendum-
a7105546.html >. 
Grynbaum, Michael M.  2017a.  Trump calls the news media the 'enemy of the 
American People'.  New York Times, 17 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/business/trump-calls-the-news-
media-the-enemy-of-the-people.html?_r=0>. 
Grynbaum, Michael M.  2017b.  Trump strategist Stephen Bannon says media should 
'keep its mouth shut'.  New York Times, 26 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/26/business/media/stephen-bannon-
trump-news-media.html>. 
Halloway, Daniel.  2016.  Why TV news couldn't quit Donald Trump.  Variety, 9 
Nov.; available at <http://variety.com/2016/tv/news/donald-trump-tv-news-
1201914147/>. 
Hanft, Adam.  2016.  140-character catharsis:  the secret appeal of Trump's Rust Belt 
strategy.  Huffington Post, 5 Dec.; available at 
<http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-hanft/140-character-catharsis-
t_b_13441064.html>. 
Hanska, Jan.  2012.  Reagan's Mythical America: Storytelling as Political Leadership.  
New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Hardy, Bruce W.  2014.  Candidate traits and political choice.  Oxford Handbook of 
Political Communication, ed. Kate Kenski and Kathleen Hall Jamieson.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Harford, Tim.  2017.  The problem with facts.  Financial Times, 9 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.ft.com/content/eef2e2f8-0383-11e7-ace0-1ce02ef0def9>. 
Heller, Steven.  2014.  Bat boy, Hillary Clinton's alien baby, and a tabloid's glorious 
legacy.  Atlantic, 16 Oct.; available at 
<http://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/10/the-ingenious-
sensationalism-of-the-weekly-world-new/381525/>. 
Heim, Joe.  2017.  'They never saw this coming':  a Q&A with Kellyanne Conway.  
Washington Post, 26 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/magazine/they-never-saw-this-
coming-a-qanda-with-kellyanne-conway-on-trumps-
victory/2017/01/26/2bf64c10-da96-11e6-9a36-
1d296534b31e_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_conway-
1130pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.fd286ff9001a>. 
Hermann, Peter; Susan Svrluga; and Michael E. Miller.  2016.  Alleged gunman tells 
police he wanted to rescue children at D.C. pizza shop after haring fictional 
Internet accounts.  Washington Post, 5 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/alleged-gunman-tells-
police-he-wanted-to-rescue-children-at-dc-pizza-shop-after-hearing-fictional-
internet-accounts/2016/12/05/cb5ebabc-bae8-11e6-ac85-
094a21c44abc_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_no-
name%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.aa30c6bc523f>. 
Hiatt, Fred.  2017.  Trump considers the media his enemy.  We shouldn't treat him as 
ours. Washington Post, 29 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-considers-the-media-
his-enemy-we-shouldnt-treat-him-as-ours/2017/01/29/43ac0702-e4b2-11e6-
ba11-63c4b4fb5a63_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
b%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.477a3d0e250f>. 
Hochschild, Arlie Russell.  2016.  Strangers in Their Own Land:  Anger and 
Mourning on the American Right.  New York: New Press. 
Hochschild, Jennifer L. and Katherine Levine Einstein.  2015b.  Do facts matter?  
Information and misinformation in American politics.  Political Science 
Quarterly, 130 (4): 585-624. 
Hume, David.   1777.  Of miracles.  Sec 10 of Enquiry Concerning  Human 
Understanding.  London:  T. Cadell.   
Ignatius, David.  2016.  In today's world, the truth is losing.  Washington Post, 29 
Nov.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/people/david-
ignatius/?utm_term=.ad642900d112>. 
Ipsos MORI.  2016.  Ipsos MORI June 2016 political monitor, Topline results, 16 June 
2016.  Available at <https://www.ipsos-mori.com/Assets/Docs/Polls/pm-16-
june-2016-topline.pdf>. 
Isenberg, Nancy.  2016.  White Trash: The 400-year Untold History of Class in 
America.  New York: Viking. 
Islam, Faisal. 2016a.  Can Wollaston call £450m Brexit claim a lie?  Sky News, 9 June; 
available at < http://news.sky.com/story/can-wollaston-call-163350m-brexit-
claim-a-lie-10308489>. 
Islam, Faisal.  2016b.  EU:  in or out? Faisal Islam interview with Michael Gove, 3 
June 2016.  Sky News, 3 June; available at <https://corporate.sky.com/media-
centre/media-packs/2016/eu-in-or-out-faisal-islam-interview-with-michael-
gove,-30616-8pm>. 
Isaac, Mike.  2016.  Facebook mounts effort to limit tide of fake news.  New York 
Times, 15 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/technology/facebook-fake-
news.html>. 
ITV.  2016.  UK does get back some of the £350m it sends to EU, Boris Johnson 
admits.  ITV Report, 11 May; available at <http://www.itv.com/news/2016-05-
11/uk-does-get-back-some-of-350m-it-sends-to-eu-boris-johnson-admits/>. 
Jacobs, Jennifer and Billy House.  2016.  Trump: polls made me think 'we're not 
going to win'.  Bloomberg News/Newsmax, 14 Dec.; available at 
<http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/trump-polls-election-
lose/2016/12/14/id/763840/>. 
Jackson, Jasper.  2017.  In the post-truth era Sweden's far right fake fact checker was 
inevitable. Guardian, 19 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/jan/19/in-the-post-truth-era-
swedens-far-right-fake-fact-checker-was-inevitable>. 
James, Aaron.  2016.  Assholes: A Theory of Donald Trump.  New York: Doubleday. 
Jamieson, Amber and Olivia Solon.  2016.  Facebook to begin flagging fake news in 
response to mounting criticism.  Guardian, 16 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/15/facebook-flag-fake-
news-fact-check>. 
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall and Joseph N. Cappella.  2008.  Echo Chamber:  Rush 
Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment.  New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Janis, Irving L.  1972.  Groupthink.  Boston:  Houghton Mifflin. 
Johnson, Jeena.  2017.  In his first major TV interview as president, Trump is 
obsessed with his popularity.  Washington Post, 26 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/26/in-his-
first-major-tv-interview-as-president-trump-is-endlessly-obsessed-about-his-
popularity/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_pp-trumptv-
330am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.893744c74691 >. 
Johnson, Jenna and Matt Zapotosky.  2017.  Trump seeks 'major investigation' into 
unsupported claims of voter fraud.  Washington Post, 25 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/25/trump-
seeks-major-investigation-into-unsupported-claims-of-voter-
fraud/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_investigation-
825a%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.6cce33110c2a>. 
Jones, Chris.  2017.  Alec Baldwin's quest to conquer Trump.  Atlantic, 319 (#4: May): 
46-58. 
Jones, Susan.  2017.  Paul Ryan views Trump as 'a man of action, ready to get 
working'.  CBS News, 11 Nov.; available at 
<http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/paul-ryan-views-trump-
man-actionready-get-working>. 
Jütten, Timo.  2017.  Dignity, esteem and social contribution: a recognition-
theoretical view. Journal of Political Philosophy, forthcoming. 
Kahn, Chris.  2016.  More Republicans expect Clinton, rather than Trump, to win 
U.S. election. Reuters, 26 Oct.; available at 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-poll-idUSKCN12Q2WK>. 
Kassam, Ashifa.  2017. 'You scare the heck out of me': Twitter feed collects Trump 
voters' regrets. Guardian, 5 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/05/trump-regrets-twitter-
voters-election-ashamed>. 
Keillor, Garrison.  2016a.  Trump voters – its not me, it's you.  Washington Post, 21 
Nov.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-
voters--its-not-me-its-you/2016/11/21/92d7c884-b005-11e6-be1c-
8cec35b1ad25_story.html?utm_term=.4e48c9282626>. 
Keillor, Garrison.  2016b.  Trump voters will not like what happens next.  
Washington Post, 9 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-voters-will-not-like-
what-happens-next/2016/11/09/e346ffc2-a67f-11e6-8fc0-
7be8f848c492_story.html?utm_term=.8a225db695e3 >. 
Kelly, Andrew.  2016.  Why I voted for Donald Trump.  Washington Post, 13 Nov.; 
available at <https://www.pressreader.com/>. 
Kelly, Paul.  2009.  The March of Patriots:  The Struggle for Modern Australia.  
Melbourne:  Melbourne University Press. 
Kessler, Glenn.  2013.  About the Fact Checker.  Washington Post, 11 Sept.; available 
at < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/about-the-fact-
checker/?utm_term=.34e82f750bba>. 
Kessler, Glenn.  2015.  Trump's absurd claim that the 'real' unemployment rate is 42 
percent.  Washington Post, 18 Aug.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2015/08/21/trumps-absurd-claim-the-real-unemployment-rate-is-
42-percent/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.bb95d53ec4f1>. 
Kessler, Glenn.  2016a.  The biggest Pinocchios of 2016.  Washington Post, 16 Dec.; 
available at < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2016/12/16/the-biggest-pinocchios-of-2016/?hpid=hp_hp-more-
top-stories_factchecker-2016roundup-
310am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.4226cac14da4>. 
Kessler, Glenn.  2016b.  The Fact Checker's guide for detecting fake news.  
Washington Post, 22 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/11/22/the-
fact-checkers-guide-for-detecting-fake-
news/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.10749890021d>. 
Kessler, Glenn.  2017a.  Recidivism watch:  Trump's claim that millions of people 
voted illegally.  Washington Post, 24 Jan.; available at < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2017/01/24/recidivism-watch-trumps-claim-that-3-5-million-
people-voted-illegally-in-the-election/?utm_term=.e43104b3b61d>. 
Kessler, Glenn.  2017b.  Spicer earns four Pinocchios for a series of false claims on 
inauguration crowd size.  Washington Post, 22 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/01/22/spicer-
earns-four-pinocchios-for-a-series-of-false-claims-on-inauguration-crowd-
size/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_fc-spicer-
1203pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.02ec8eae74c1>. 
Kessler, Glenn and Michelle Ye Hee Lee.  2016.  Fact-checking Donald Trump's 
acceptance speech at the 2016 RNC.  Washington Post, 22 July; available at < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2016/07/22/fact-
checking-donald-trumps-acceptance-speech-at-the-2016-
rnc/?utm_term=.c32488ea2c17>. 
Kessler, Glenn and Michelle Ye Hee Lee.  2017.  President Trump's cascade of false 
claims in Time's interview on his falsehoods.  Washington Post, 23 Mar.; 
available at < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2017/03/23/president-trumps-cascade-of-false-claims-in-times-
interview-on-his-falsehoods/?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_fact-checker-
940am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.b1cdc60e5421>. 
Kessler, Glenn; Michelle Ye Hee Lee; Leslie Shapiro; and Aaron Williams.  2016.  The 
2016 election Fact Checker.  Washington Post, 3 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/fact-
checker/?tid=a_inl>. 
Killick, Ana.  2017.  Do people really lack knowledge about the economy?  Political 
Quarterly, 88: 265-72. 
Kirzinger, Ashley; Elise Sugarman; and Mollyann Brodie.  2016.  Kaiser Health 
Tracking Poll:  November 2016.  Available at <http://kff.org/health-
reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-november-2016/>. 
Kizenko, Peter.  2016.  Uncensored: an inside look at a Donald Trump rally.  The 
Duran, 24 Oct.; available at <http://theduran.com/uncensored-an-inside-look-
at-a-donald-trump-rally/>. 
Kovalev, Alexey.  2017.  I've reported on Putin – here are my tips for journalists 
dealing with Trump. Guardian, 23 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/23/reported-putin-
journalists-trump-media>. 
Lau, Richard R.; Lee Sigelman; Caroline Heldman; and Paul Babbit.  1999.  The 
effects of negative political advertisements:  a meta-analytic assessment.  
American Political Science Review, 93: 851-75. 
Lee, Michelle Ye Hee.  2017.  Recidivism watch: Spicer uses repeatedly debunked 
citations for Trump's voter fraud claims.  Washington Post, 24 Jan.; available 
at < https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-
checker/wp/2017/01/24/recidivism-watch-spicer-uses-repeatedly-debunked-
citations-for-trumps-voter-fraud-claims/?utm_term=.7cd16d4f44c3>. 
Lee, Michelle Ye Hee; Glenn Kessler; and Leslie Shapiro.  2017.  100 days of Trump 
claims.  Washington Post, 21 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/trump-
claims/?utm_term=.8558219038d6>.  
Lee, M.J.; Sara Murray; Jeremy Diamond; Noah Gray; and Tal Kopan.  2016.  Why 
I'm voting for Trump:  CNN talks to more than 150 people in 31 cities to 
explore what's driving the Trump phenomenon.  CNN, 28 Jan.; available at < 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/27/politics/donald-trump-voters-2016-
election/>.  
Lelkes, Yphtach; Gaurav Sood; and Shanto Iyengar.  2017.  The hostile audience:  the 
effect of access to broadband internet on partisan affect.  American Journal of 
Political Science, 61: 5-20. 
Loofbourow, Lili.  2016.  Welcome to Trumplandia, where feelings trump facts.  The 
Week, 20 Oct.; available at <http://theweek.com/articles/656455/welcome-
trumplandia-where-feelings-trump-facts>. 
Lozada, Carlos.  2015.  How Donald Trump plays the press, in his own words.  
Washington Post, 17 June; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/book-party/wp/2015/06/17/how-
donald-trump-plays-the-press-in-his-own-
words/?utm_term=.262e91ba30db>. 
Lu, Rachel.  2016.  You can make your protest vote count.  Here's how.  The 
Federalist, 31 Oct.; available at <http://thefederalist.com/2016/10/31/make-
your-protest-vote-count/>. 
Luck, Matthew.  2016.  Polling lessons from Brexit:  the reason the UK voted to leave 
the European Union and others could follow.  Available at 
<http://addeurope.org/doc/POLLING_LESSONS_FROM_BREXIT-
THE_REASON_THE_UK_VOTED_TO_LEAVE_THE_EUROPEAN_UNION
_AND_HOW_OTHERS_COULD_FOLLOW.pdf >. 
Major, Kirsty.  2016.  Why are we so surprised that Boris Johnson lied when he's 
been sacked for lying twice before? Independent, 28 June; available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-are-we-so-surprised-that-boris-
johnson-lied-when-he-s-been-sacked-for-lying-twice-before-a7105976.html>. 
Marcus, Ruth.  2016.  Welcome to the post-truth presidency.  Washington Post, 2 
Dec.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/welcome-to-
the-post-truth-presidency/2016/12/02/baaf630a-b8cd-11e6-b994-
f45a208f7a73_story.html?utm_term=.2d96cf1e091f>. 
Marcus, Ruth.  2017.  Forget the post-truth presidency.  Welcome to the pre-truth 
presidency.  Washington Post, 23 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/welcome-to-the-pre-truth-
presidency/2017/03/23/b35856ca-1007-11e7-9b0d-
d27c98455440_story.html?utm_term=.810ba1ae09c2>. 
Martin, Douglas.  2009.  Walter Cronkite, 92, dies; trusted voice of TV news.  New 
York Times, 17 July; available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/us/18cronkite.html?pagewanted=all&_
r=0>. 
Maskin, Eric and Amartya Sen.  2016.  How majority rule might have stopped 
Donald Trump.  New York Times, 28 April; available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/01/opinion/sunday/how-majority-rule-
might-have-stopped-donald-trump.html>. 
Masur, Louis P.  2012.  Lincoln tells a story.  New York Times, 27 Jan.; available at 
<https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/lincoln-tells-a-
story/?_r=0>. 
Mayer, Jane.  2016.  Donald Trump's ghostwriter tells all.  New Yorker, 25 July; 
available at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/07/25/donald-
trumps-ghostwriter-tells-all >. 
McAdams, Dan P.  2016.  The mind of Donald Trump.  Atlantic, June; available at < 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/the-mind-of-donald-
trump/480771/>. 
McCarthy, Tom.  2017.  Can Trump really make America great again?  Guardian, 18 
Jan.; available at <https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/jan/17/donald-trump-america-great-again-northampton-county-
pennsylvania>. 
McCoy, Terrence.  2016.  For the 'new yellow journalists,' opportunity comes in clicks 
and bucks.  20 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/for-the-new-yellow-journalists-
opportunity-comes-in-clicks-and-bucks/2016/11/20/d58d036c-adbf-11e6-8b45-
f8e493f06fcd_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.7d905ff067c7>. 
Merriman, Justin.  2016.  Taking Trump seriously, not literally.  Atlantic, Sept.; 
available at <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/trump-
makes-his-case-in-pittsburgh/501335/>. 
Milbank, Dana.  2017.  Shoker! Rediculous chocker Trump attaks and dishoners 
English with ever-dummer spellings.  Washington Post, 7 Feb.; available at < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/shoker-rediculous-chocker-
trump-attaks-and-dishoners-english-with-ever-dummer-
spellings/2017/02/07/9556faf4-ed58-11e6-9662-
6eedf1627882_story.html?utm_term=.bb888fef6c23>. 
Miller, Warren E. and Donald E. Stokes.  1963.  Constituency influence in Congress.  
American Political Science Review, 57:  45-56. 
Moyer, Justin Wm.; Jenny Starrs; and Sarah Larimer.  2016.  Trump supporter 
charged after sucker-punching protester at North Carolina rally.  
Washington Post, 11 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/03/10/trump-protester-sucker-punched-at-north-carolina-rally-
videos-show/?utm_term=.6dd4483767ec>. 
Naughton, John.  2017.  Is technology smart enough to fix the fake news frenzy?  
Guardian, 4 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/04/technology-
fake-news-frenzy-google-facebook-donald-trump>. 
NBC Meet the Press.  2017.  Meet the Press 1/1/17.  Available at 
<http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-1-1-17-n702006>. 
Newton, Kenneth and Malcolm Brynin.  2001.  The national press and party voting 
in Britain.  Political Studies, 49: 265-85. 
Nossel, Suzanne.  2017.  Donald Trump treats the press like an authoritarian thug.  
Guardian, 12 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/12/donald-trump-
press-conference-cnn-journalist-acosta>. 
Novitz, David.  1980.  Of fact and fancy.  American Philosophical Quarterly, 17: 143-
9. 
Nyhan, Brendan and Jason Reifler. 2010.  When corrections fail: the persistence of 
political misperceptions.  Political Behavior, 32:  303-30. 
Nyhan, Brendan and Jason Reifler. 2015.  The effect of fact-checking on elites: a field 
experiment on U.S. state legislators.  American Journal of Political Science, 
59: 628-40. 
Obama, Barack.  2016.  Obama reckons with a Trump presidency.  New Yorker, 28 
Nov.; available at <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/obama-
reckons-with-a-trump-presidency>. 
Obama, Barack. 2017.  President Obama's Farewell Address: full text and video.  
New York Times, 10 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/10/us/politics/obama-farewell-address-
speech.html >. 
O'Harrow, Robert Jr. and Shawn Boburg.  2016.  The man who showed Donald 
Trump how to exploit power and instill fear.  Washington Post, 17 June; 
available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/former-
mccarthy-aide-showed-trump-how-to-exploit-power-and-draw-
attention/2016/06/16/e9f44f20-2bf3-11e6-9b37-
42985f6a265c_story.html?utm_term=.d3ae78e4d781>. 
Ohlheiser, Abby. 2016.  This is how Facebook's fake-news writers make money.  
Washington Post, 18 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2016/11/18/this-is-
how-the-internets-fake-news-writers-make-
money/?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.835b9f726f29>. 
Oliver, Eric and Thomas Wood.  2016.  A new poll shows 52% of Republicans 
actually think Trump won the popular vote.  Monkey Cage, 18 Dec.; 
available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/12/18/a-new-poll-shows-an-astonishing-52-of-republicans-
think-trump-won-the-popular-vote/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_mc-
goppoll-1114am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.6ead01f6dce8>. 
O'Neil, Cathy.  2016.  Weapons of Math Destruction:  How Big Data Increases 
Inequality and Threatens Democracy.  New York: Random House. 
Orwell, George.  1949.  Nineteen Eighty-four.  London: Secker & Warburg. 
Oxford Dictionaries.  2016.  Word of the year 2016 is...  Available at 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 
>. 
Pariser, Eli. 2011.  The Filter Bubble:  What the Internet Is Hiding from You.  New 
York: Penguin.  
Parker, Ashley and Sean Sullivan.  2017.  Reality check: many of Trump's early vows 
will probably never happen.  Washington Post, 26 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/reality-check-many-of-trumps-
early-vows-will-never-actually-happen/2017/01/26/2d56bfda-e3e3-11e6-879b-
356663383f1b_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_trumpreality-
7a%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.d8b55d05bc99>. 
Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews.  2016.  The Russian 'firehose of falsehood' 
propaganda model:  why it might work and options to counter it.  
Perspective PE-198-OSD, RAND National Defense Research Institute.  
Available at <http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html>. 
Pengelly, Martin.  2017.  Kellyanne Conway:  'alternative facts' was my Oscars La La 
Land blunder.  Guardian, 3 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/03/kellyanne-conway-
alternative-facts-mistake-oscars>. 
Persily, Nathaniel.  2017.  Can democracy survive the internet?  Journal of 
Democracy, 28 (2: April):  63-76. 
Pilkington, Ed.  2016.  Inside a Donald Trump rally:  good people in a feedback loop 
of paranoia and hate.  Guardian, 30 Oct.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/oct/30/donald-trump-voters-
rally-election-crowd>. 
Pilkington, Ed.  2017.  Macomb v media:  voters who read little news think Trump had 
a great first week.  Guardian, 27 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/27/donald-trump-
michigan-voters-media>. 
Poynter.  2017.  International Fact-checking Network fact-checkers' code of 
principles.  Available at < http://www.poynter.org/fact-checkers-code-of-
principles/>. 
Prior, Markus; Gaurav sood; and Kabir Khanna.  2015.  You cannot be serious: the 
impact of accuracy incentives on partisan bias in reports of economic 
perceptions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 10: 489-518. 
Prose, Francine.  2016.  Truth is evaporating before our eyes.  Guardian, 19 Dec.; 
available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/dec/19/truth-is-
evaporating-before-our-eyes>. 
Queenan, Joe.  2017.  Mel Brooks:  'Donald Trump doesn't scare me.  He's a song-
and-dance man'.  Guardian, 10 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/feb/10/mel-brooks-donald-trump-
doesnt-scare-me-hes-a-song-and-dance-man >. 
Rabin-Havt, Ari.  2016.  Trump's outrageous lies come straight from big businesses' 
playbook.  Washington Post, 16 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/12/16/trumps-
outrageous-lies-come-straight-from-big-businessess-playbook/?hpid=hp_hp-
cards_hp-card-
posteverything%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.1ac288a5445a>. 
Rampell, Catherine.  2016.  When the facts don't matter, how can democracy 
survive?  Washington Post, 17 Oct.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-the-facts-dont-matter-
how-can-democracy-survive/2016/10/17/560ff302-94a5-11e6-9b7c-
57290af48a49_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.729435a50d7e>. 
Rawlinson, Kevin.  2017.  Fake news is 'killing people's minds' says Apple boss Tim 
Cook.  Guardian, 11 Feb.; available at < 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/11/fake-news-is-killing-
peoples-minds-says-apple-boss-tim-cook>. 
Rehm, Diane; with Major Garrett, Abby Phillip, Olivier Knox.  2016a.  Friday News 
Roundup – Domestic, Friday, Nov 18, 2016.  The Diane Rehm Show, 18 Nov.; 
available at <http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2016-11-18/friday-news-
roundup-domestic>. 
Rehm, Diane; with James Fallows, Margaret Sullivan, Glenn Thrush, Mark Baldwin 
and Scottie Nell Hughes.  2016b.  How journalists are rethinking their role 
under a Trump presidency.  The Diane Rehm Show, 30 Nov.; available at 
<http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2016-11-30/how-journalists-are-
rethinking-their-role-under-a-trump-presidency>. 
Reuters.  2017.  Germany investigating unprecedented spread of fake news online.  
Guardian, 9 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/09/germany-investigating-
spread-fake-news-online-russia-election >. 
Rich, Frank.  2016.  Ronald Reagan was once Donald Trump.  New York Magazine, 
30 May; available at <http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/05/ronald-
reagan-was-once-donald-trump.html>. 
Riffkin, Rebecca.  2015.  Americans' trust in media remains at historical low.  Gallup, 
15 Sept.; available at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/185927/americans-trust-
media-remains-historical-low.aspx>. 
Rosen, Jay; Erik Wemple; and James Downie.  2017.  Should the media boycott the 
White House?  Washington Post, 1 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/should-the-media-boycott-the-
white-house/2017/03/01/57d3968e-fed2-11e6-8ebe-
6e0dbe4f2bca_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
f%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.2ff3d3e90b12>. 
Rubin, Jennifer.  2017.  Maybe Trump isn't 'lying'.  Washington Post, 25 Jan.; 
available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-
turn/wp/2017/01/25/maybe-trump-isnt-lying/?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-
card-e%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.b61a454e07d8>. 
Rucker, Philip; Jo0hn Wagner; and Greg Miller.  2017b.  Trump, in CIA visit, attacks 
media for coverage of his inaugural crowds.  Washington Post, 21 Jan.; 
available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-in-cia-visit-
attacks-media-for-coverage-of-his-inaugural-crowds/2017/01/21/f4574dca-
e019-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-bignews3_pp-cia-
1141am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.50f428a5db9d >. 
Ryan, Frances.  2016.  Martin's already lost almost everything – he voted leave to 
spread the pain.  Guardian, 30 June; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/30/martin-nothing-
lose-vote-leave-unemployed-benefits-sanctioned>. 
Saad, Lydia.  2017.  Approval of Trump transition still low as inauguration ears.  
Gallup, 12 Jan.; available at <www.gallup.com/poll/201833/approval-trump-
transition-low-inauguration-nears.aspx >. 
Safire, William.  1988.  Watch what we do.  New York Times, 14 Nov.; available at < 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/11/14/opinion/essay-watch-what-we-
do.html>. 
Saletan, William. 2016.  Trump’s voters don’t support deportation -- and other 
surprises from the 2016 exit polls.  Slate, 9 Nov.; available at 
<http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/11/debunkin
g_myths_about_trump_voters_with_exit_polls.html>. 
Sargent, Greg. 2017a.  GOP voters know Trump is telling them the truth, and the 
media is lying.  Washington Post, 22 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/02/22/gop-
voters-know-trump-is-telling-them-the-truth-and-the-media-is-lying-to-
them/?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
f%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.a7f2d3cb0411>. 
Sargent, Greg. 2017b.  Trump's lies are working brilliantly.  This new poll proves it.  
Washington Post, 27 Ap.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2017/04/27/trumps-
lies-are-working-brilliantly-this-new-poll-proves-it/?hpid=hp_no-
name_opinion-card-f%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.dd5bee4f7032>. 
Schaffner, Brian and Samantha Luks.  2017.  This is what Trump voters said when 
asked to compare his inauguration crowd with Obama's.  Monkey Cage, 25 
Jan.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/01/25/we-asked-people-which-inauguration-crowd-was-
bigger-heres-what-they-said/?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-
main_trumpfacts805p%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.ac44a79ef094>. 
Schrag, Peter.  1969.  The forgotten American.  Harper's, Aug., pp. 27-34.  Available 
at 
<http://web.mit.edu/21h.102/www/Primary%20source%20collections/Vietna
m/Schrag,%20Forgotten_American.htm>. 
Schwartzman, Micah J.  2011.  The sincerity of public reason.  Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 19: 375-98. 
Ship, Chris.  2016.  ITV EU referendum debate: Boris Johnson focus of 'Remain' 
attacks'. ITV News, 9 June; available at <http://www.itv.com/news/2016-06-
09/boris-focus-of-remain-attacks-in-fiery-eu-referendum-debate/>. 
Siddique, Haroon.  2017.  Teach schoolchildren how to spot fake news, says OECD.  
Guardian, 18 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/mar/18/teach-schoolchildren-
spot-fake-news-says-oecd >. 
Sidgwick, Henry.  1907.  The Methods of Ethics, 7th edn.  London: Macmillan. 
Silverman, Craig.  2016.  This analysis shows how viral fake election news stories 
outperformed real news on Facebook.  BuzzFeed, 17 Nov.; available at < 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/viral-fake-election-news-outperformed-
real-news-on-facebook?utm_term=.idRXzGwDJz#.hkWvre5x6r>. 
Sennett, Richard and Jonathan Cobb.  1993.  The Hidden Injuries of Class.  New 
York: Norton. 
Shane, Scott.  2017.  From headline to photograph, a fake news masterpiece.  New 
York Times, 18 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/us/fake-news-hillary-clinton-
cameron-
harris.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=b-lede-package-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-
news&_r=1>. 
Sherwood, Harriet.  2016. Pope Francis compares fake news consumption to eating 
faeces. Guardian, 8 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/07/pope-compares-fake-
news-consumption-to-eating-faeces-coprophilia>. 
Silver, Nate. 2016.  How much did Comey hurt Clinton's chances?  538 Politics, 6 
Nov.; available at <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-much-did-
comey-hurt-clintons-chances/>. 
Sinderbrand, Rebecca.  2017.  How Kellyanne Conway ushered in the era of 
'alternative facts'.  Washington Post, 22 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/22/how-
kellyanne-conway-ushered-in-the-era-of-alternative-facts/?hpid=hp_hp-top-
table-main_fix-conwaytranscript-
138pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.6e9cfda619b6>. 
Solon, Olivia.  2017.  Tim Berners-Lee calls for tighter regulation of online political 
advertising.  Guardian, 12 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/11/tim-berners-lee-
online-political-advertising-regulation>. 
Soroka, Stuart; Blake Andrew; Toril Aalberg; Shanto Iyengar; James Curran; Sharon 
Coen; Kaori Hayashi; Paul Jones; Bianpetro Mazzoleni; June Woong Rhee; 
David Row; and Rod Tiffen.  2013.  Auntie knows best? Public broadcasters 
and current affairs knowledge.  British Journal of Political Science, 43: 719-39. 
Sparrow, Andrew.  2016a.  David Davis questioned by MPs over Brexit.  Guardian, 
14 Sept.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/live/2016/sep/13/boundary-
review-corbyn-says-inner-city-seat-shouldnt-be-enlarged-politics-live>. 
Sparrow, Andrew.  2016b.  Thirty things you didn't know about the EU referendum.  
Guardian, 22 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2016/dec/22/thirty-things-you-
didnt-know-about-the-eu-referendum>. 
Spenkuch, Jörg L.  2015.  (Ir)rational voters?  Mimeo., Northwestern University.  
Available at 
<http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/spenkuch/research/voting.pd
f>. 
Spenkuch, Jörg L. and David Toniatti.  2016.  Political advertising and election 
outcomes.  CESinf Working Paper Series No. 5780.  Available at 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2753512>. 
Steinberg, Tom.  2016.  Facebook post, 24 June.  Available at 
<https://www.facebook.com/tom.steinberg.503/posts/10157028566365237>. 
Stelter, Biran.  2016.  Following up with Scottie Nell Hughes about facts.  CNN 
Money: Reliable Sources; available at < http://us11.campaign-
archive1.com/?u=47c9040f6ff957a59bd88396e&id=781d6ae935>. 
Stone, Jon. 2016a.  Brexit Secretary David Davis says EU referendum campaign 
untruths 'not important'.  The Independent, 5 Oct.; available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-davis-brexit-
secretary-eu-referendum-campaign-lies-a7344611.html>. 
Stone, Jon.  2016b.  Nigel Farage backtracks on Leave campaign's '£350m for the 
NHS' pledge hours after result.  The Independent, 24 June; available at 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-result-
nigel-farage-nhs-pledge-disowns-350-million-pounds-a7099906.html>. 
Sullivan, Margaret.  2016.  The post-truth world of the Trump administration is 
scarier than you think.  Washington Post, 4 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-post-truth-world-of-
the-trump-administration-is-scarier-than-you-think/2016/12/02/ebda952a-
b897-11e6-b994-f45a208f7a73_story.html?utm_term=.fea321e6735e>. 
Sullivan, Margaret.  2017a.  Don't get fooled again by bogus links, bots and pure 
bunk.  Washington Post, 31 Mar.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/dont-get-fooled-again-by-
bogus-links-bots-and-pure-bunk-heres-how/2017/03/31/b8758104-14bd-
11e7-833c-503e1f6394c9_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-more-top-stories_sullivan-
1125am%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.98816e4ad387>. 
Sullivan, Margaret.  2017b.  It's time to retire the tainted term 'fake news'.  
Washington Post, 8 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/its-time-to-retire-the-
tainted-term-fake-news/2017/01/06/a5a7516c-d375-11e6-945a-
76f69a399dd5_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-top-table-main_sullivan-
435pm%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.e44981fb8ccc>. 
Sunstein, Cass R.  2001.  Republic.com.  Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press. 
Suskind, Ron.  2004 Faith, certainty and the presidency of George W. Bush.  New 
York Times Magazine, 17 Oct.; available at 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/17/magazine/faith-certainty-and-the-
presidency-of-george-w-bush.html?_r=0>. 
Swaim, Barton.  2017.  At least this time we don't have to pretend the president's 
good.  Washington Post, 19 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2017/01/19/at-
least-this-time-we-dont-have-to-pretend-the-presidents-good/?hpid=hp_no-
name_opinion-card-e%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.0e5d516ae904>. 
Swan, Jonathan.  2016.  Trump: 'forget the press, read the internet'.  The Hill, 18 Oct.; 
available at <http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/301634-
trump-forget-the-press-read-the-internet>. 
Swift, Jonathan.  1710.  The art of political lying.  The Examiner, 9 Nov.  Reprinted in 
Swift, Works, ed. Thomas Roscoe (London:  George Bell & Sons, 1880), vol. 2, 
pp. 402-5. 
Trump, Donald J.  2016a.  Full text: Donald Trump 2016 RNC draft speech transcript.  
Available at: <http://www.politico.com/story/2016/07/full-transcript-donald-
trump-nomination-acceptance-speech-at-rnc-225974>. 
Trump, Donald J.  2016b.  Transcript of speech at Roanoke, Virginia, rally, Sept 24.  
WHSV 3; available at <http://www.whsv.com/content/news/WATCH-Live-
raw-video-of-Trump-rally-in-Virginia-394694121.html>. 
Trump, Donald J.  2017a.  Donald Trump's full inauguration speech transcript, 
annotated.  Washington Post, 20 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/20/donald-
trumps-full-inauguration-speech-transcript-
annotated/?utm_term=.3ac8ad9f0b1d>. 
Trump, Donald J.  2017b.  Donald Trump's news conference:  full transcript and 
video.  New York Times, 11 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-
transcript.html>. 
Trump, Donald J.  2017c.  Trump CIA speech transcript.  CBS News, 21 Jan.; 
available at <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-cia-speech-transcript/>. 
Tumulty, Karen and David Nakamura. 2017.  Trump's rallying cry:  fear itself.  
Washington Post, 3 Feb.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trumps-rallying-cry-fear-
itself/2017/02/03/7d2a0432-ea4a-11e6-bf6f-
301b6b443624_story.html?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-
politics%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.8177986689cd>. 
Tumulty, Karen and Philip Rucker.  2016.  Shouting match erupts between Clinton 
and Trump aides.  Washington Post, 1 Dec: available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/shouting-match-erupts-between-
clinton-and-trump-aides/2016/12/01/7ac4398e-b7ea-11e6-b8df-
600bd9d38a02_story.html?hpid=hp_rhp-top-table-
main_election750p%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&tid=a_inl&utm_term=.e65e05554
98e>. 
TwitterCounter.  2017.  Donald Trump Twitter stats.  Available at 
<http://twittercounter.com/realDonaldTrump?utm_expid=102679131-
118.LzR3SMUURL24X3MIR-
d_FA.0&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com.au%2Furl%3Fsa%
3Dt%26rct%3Dj%26q%3D%26esrc%3Ds%26source%3Dweb%26cd%3D13%26
ved%3D0ahUKEwjg7ZXlmcrRAhULzLwKHUxVBdEQFghQMAw%26url%3
Dhttp%253A%252F%252Ftwittercounter.com%252FrealDonaldTrump%26us
g%3DAFQjCNENEdgsIForJmhhEnJZx961c4P9gw >. 
Tynan, Dan.  2016.  How Facebook powers money machines for obsure political 
'news' sites. Guardian, 25 Aug.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/24/facebook-clickbait-
political-news-sites-us-election-trump>. 
UK Electoral Commission.  2016a.  Electoral Commission designates 'Vote Leave Ltd' 
and 'The In Campaign Ltd' as lead campaigners at EU Referendum.  
Available at <http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/i-am-
a/journalist/electoral-commission-media-centre/news-releases-
referendums/electoral-commission-designates-vote-leave-ltd-and-the-in-
campaign-ltd-as-lead-campaigners-at-eu-referendum>. 
UK Electoral Commission.  2016b.  EU referendum results.  Available at 
<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-
subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-
referendum/electorate-and-count-information >. 
UK Statistics Authority. 2016.  The UK contribution to the EU budget.  Available at 
<http://visual.ons.gov.uk/uk-perspectives-2016-the-uk-contribution-to-the-
eu-budget/>. 
US Director of National Intelligence.  2017.  Assessing Russian Activities and 
Intentions in Recent US Elections.  Intelligence Community Assessment ICA 
2017-01D, 6 January 2017.  Washington, DC:  Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, National Intelligence Council.  Available at 
<https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf>. 
Vicario, Michela Del; Alessandro Bessi; Fabiana Zollo; Fabio Petroni; Antonio Scala; 
Guido Caldarelli; H. Eugene Stanley; and Walter Quattrociocchi.  2016.  The 
spreading of misinformation online.  Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 113: 554-9. 
Vine, Sarah.  2016.  'Gosh, I suppose I better get up!' Sarah Vine (aka Mrs Gove) 
reveals what her husband said when he learned Leave had won the 
referendum... and how PM's resignation was 'absolutely' not intended.  Daily 
Mail, 29 June; available at <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
3665146/SARAH-VINE-Victory-vitriol-craziest-days-life.html>. 
Viner, Katharine.  2016.  How technology disrupted the truth.  Guardian, 12 July; 
available at <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-
technology-disrupted-the-truth>. 
Voss, Stephen.  2016.  Hitchens Prize:  Washington Post editor Marty Baron has a 
message to journalists in the Trump era.  Washington Post, 30 Nov.; available 
at <http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/11/washington-post-editor-marty-
baron-message-to-journalists>. 
Vyse, Graham.  2016.  Newt Gingrich is already deifying Donald Trump.  New 
Republic, 14 Dec.; available at <https://newrepublic.com/article/139321/newt-
gingrich-already-deifying-donald-trump>. 
Wagner, John.  2017.  Trump agrees with Bannon's assessment that the media is the 
'opposition party'. Washington Post, 27 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/27/trump-
agrees-with-bannons-assessment-that-the-media-is-the-opposition-
party/?hpid=hp_hp-cards_hp-card-
politics%3Ahomepage%2Fcard&utm_term=.4f0881e0a70d>. 
Wang, Amy B.  2016.  'Post-truth' named 2016 word of the year by Oxford 
Dictionaries.  Washington Post, 16 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/post-truth-
named-2016-word-of-the-year-by-oxford-
dictionaries/?utm_term=.281432aa9404>. 
Washington Post Editorial Board.  2016.  D.C. pizzeria is casualty of Trump's safe 
zone for fact-free discourse. Washington Post, 6 Dec.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/dc-pizzeria-is-a-casualty-of-
trumps-safe-zone-for-fact-free-discourse/2016/12/06/b68708ba-bb1f-11e6-
ac85-094a21c44abc_story.html?utm_term=.1a53d69df803>. 
Washington Post Editorial Board.  2017.  The absurd conspiracy theory around Seth 
Rich's death causes real harm. Washington Post, 22 May; available at < 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-absurd-conspiracy-theory-
around-seth-richs-death-causes-real-harm/2017/05/22/520ba572-3f21-
11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
d%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.b791a4a3c2f2>. 
Wasserman, David.  2017.  2016 popular vote tracker:  the certified results for all 50 
states and Washington D.C.  The Cook Political Report, 3 Jan; available at < 
http://cookpolitical.com/story/10174>. 
Weedon, Jen; William Nuland; and Alex Stamos.  2017.  Information Operations and 
Facebook.  Mountain View, CA: Facebook.  Available at: 
<https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2017/04/facebook-and-
information-operations-v1.pdf>. 
Wemple, Erik.  2017a.  Guess who's now accusing others of spreading 'fake news'.  
Washington Post, 11 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2017/01/11/guess-
whos-now-accusing-others-of-spreading-fake-
news/?utm_term=.ada825fdcabd >. 
Wemple, Erik.  2017b.  The life-sucking tedium of covering official lies.  Washington 
Post, 9 Feb.; available at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-
wemple/wp/2017/02/09/the-life-sucking-tedium-of-covering-official-
lies/?hpid=hp_no-name_opinion-card-
e%3Ahomepage%2Fstory&utm_term=.4f6bf2b275bc >. 
Wilson, Deirdre and Dan Sperber.  2012.  Meaning and Relevance.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wingfield, Nick; Mike Isaac; and Katie Benner.  2016.  Google and Facebook take aim 
at fake news sites.  New York Times, 14 Nov.; available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/technology/google-will-ban-websites-
that-host-fake-news-from-using-its-ad-service.html>. 
YouGov. 2016a.  Times survey results, 20-22 June; available at 
<https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/atmwrg
evvj/TimesResults_160622_EVEOFPOLL.pdf>. 
YouGov. 2016b.  Today Programme survey results, 13-14 June; available at 
<https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/x4iynd1
mn7/TodayResults_160614_EUReferendum_W.pdf>. 
Yuhas, Alan.  2016.  How does Donald Trump lie? A fact checker's final guide.  
Guardian, 7 Nov.; available at < https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/nov/07/how-does-donald-trump-lie-fact-checker>. 
Yuhas, Alan.  2017.  Smoke and mirrors: how Trump manipulates the media and 
opponents.  Guardian, 18 Jan.; available at 
<https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jan/18/donald-trump-media-
manipulation-tactics> 
 
 
